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b. United States Investors.
I. Introduction.
A. RECENT TRENDS IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA.
Attracted by the return of political stability, sound macroeconomic policy, favorable
regulatory environments, and the possibility of superior rates of return, international
investors have invested significant amounts of capital in Latin America over the course of
the last ten years. The majority of this activity has been concentrated in the form of port-
folio investment1 tied to privatization programs. 2 In line with this trend, portfolio invest-
ment increased from an annual average of U.S.$5.4 billion for the period 1986 through
1990 to approximately U.S.$68 billion in 1993.3 The remainder of Latin America's capital
inflows has, until recently, been the result of foreign direct investment 4 by international
1. See Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and Controlling
Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 543 (1996). Portfolio investment is defined as "cross-border
financial and capital market purchases of financial assets, by foreign individuals and institu-
tional investors, that do not result in managerial responsibility. These investments can be held
in domestic government debt securities and bank deposits, or as highly liquid equity securities
and debentures of the private non-financial corporate sector." The IMF defines portfolio
investment as the "international placement of bonds, issues of equities in international mar-
kets, and purchases by foreigners of stocks and financial market instruments in developing
countries' domestic markets." DAVID FOLKERTS-LANDAU ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS, PROSPECTS AND POLICY ISSUES 35 (1995).
2. In the case of Mexico, the number of state-owned enterprises has decreased from 1,155 in 1982
to 247 in 1999. Of the 247 remaining state-owned enterprises, fifty-two are currently in the
process of being privatized. Considered from the perspective of commercial lending, it is sig-
nificant to note that between 1983 and 1998, the total percent of bank credit allocated to the
public sector dropped from seventy-seven percent to twelve percent. See Mexican Ministry of
Finance, Mexico: Challenges and Opportunities at the Turn of the Century, Sept. 1999 (visited
Jan. 7, 2000) http://www.shcp.gob.mx/english/docs/991007.html [hereinafter SHCP Report].
3. The 1993 figure represented approximately sixty-six percent of gross capital inflows into Latin
America. The leading recipients were Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. See Carrasco & Thomas,
supra note 1, at 557.
4. Foreign direct investment, technically considered, entails the transfer of resources together
with the acquisition of a controlling interest in a company. See id. at 544.
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companies looking to make strategic acquisitions or develop new joint ventures.
Investment of this latter type increased from U.S.$30 billion to U.S.$50 billion between
1996 and 1997.5
B. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT AND THE ALTERNATIVE
OF PRIVATE EQUITY.
Notwithstanding the significant amount of capital provided by portfolio investment,
its effect on balance has not always been positive. One criticism concerns its "hot" nature.
That is, portfolio investors have little or no interest in the long-term future of the coun-
tries in which they invest. According to one commentator, they "want immediate returns,
and will pull out of a country quickly if they do not get them."6 Portfolio investors' ability
to move quickly in and out of Latin American capital markets can make them a highly
destabilizing force. 7 As experience in Mexico and Brazil has demonstrated, rapid capital
movements can cause "massive disruptions in local stock markets, drastic swings in inter-
est rates and huge increases in unemployment rates..8
Given the nature of portfolio investment-the purchase and sale of publicly traded
equity securities-Latin America's large, high profile companies have tended to be the
primary beneficiaries of such financing. The consequence of this tendency is to place
small to medium-sized entities (SMSEs) whose stock is neither listed nor traded, in a dis-
advantageous financing position, irrespective of their relative profitability or financial
condition. This unequal access to capital is compounded by a number of factors: Latin
America's historically low rate of savings; the fallout from the financial crises that have hit
Asia, Russia, and Brazil; the comparatively high cost of commercial credit in the region; 9
5. See Robert Danino, Corporate Finance in Latin America: Quenching the Thirst for Capital, LATIN
FIN., Mar. 1997, at 2, available in LEXIS, Country and Region (excluding U.S.) Library, Mexico
File. As was the case with portfolio investment, the primary Latin American recipients of for-
eign direct investment were Brazil (approximately U.S.$8 billion), Mexico (approximately
U.S.$7 billion), and Argentina (approximately U.S.$3.2 billion). The balance was split between
Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Id.
6. In an effort to guard against such occurrences, some countries restrict the ability of investors to
remove capital. In Chile, for example, Decree Number 600 mandates that capital cannot be
repatriated for a period of one year following an initial investment (remittances of profits can,
however, be made without limit). See Anthony M. Vernava, Latin American Finance: A
Financial, Economic, and Legal Synopsis of Debt Swaps, Privatizations, Foreign Direct Investment
Law Revisions and International Securities Issues, 15 WIS. INT'L L.J. 89, 117 (1996).
7. Over U.S.$4 billion in portfolio investment-related foreign reserves left the country within
twenty-four hours of Mexico's December 20, 1994 devaluation. See Melissa R.H. Hall,
Foreigners Funding the Future: Investment Opportunities in Mexico's Privatized Pension System,
34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 151, 158 (1999).
8. Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 1, at 543. The response of portfolio investors to this criticism
is that by conditioning continued investment on the maintenance of sound economic policy
they serve as economic disciplinarians that foreign governments can blame for necessary but
unpopular domestic programs. Id.
9. There is no effective usury law in Mexico and interest rates on commercial bank lending can be
as high as thirty percent or more. Elsewhere in Latin America, interest rates can range between
forty percent and 100 percent. See Sergio R. Bustos, Overwhelming Interest, LATIN TRADE, Feb.
1999, at 22.
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and the free trade-induced effects of increased competition. As the director of one
Brazilian fund management company observes: "[s]mall and medium companies are
squeezed in Latin America. High interest rates, combined with increased competition
from imports, have made it difficult for companies to pay their debts and even more diffi-
cult for them to raise the capital to finance expansion." 10 Insofar as the majority of com-
mercial entities in Latin America fall within the small to medium-sized classification, the
continued coalescence of these factors poses a serious threat to the region's future eco-
nomic development.11 In their attempts to avoid the detrimental consequences of over
relying on portfolio investment, many Latin American nations have begun to encourage
the development and/or adoption of new forms of attracting capital and promoting eco-
nomic growth. The regional advent of private equity financing represents one of the most
promising manifestations of these initiatives.
C. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE EQUITY FINANCING.
Acting for self-interested reasons, 12 private equity funds counter the disruptive
effects of hot money and disparate development by taking long-term, relatively illiquid
equity positions 13 in companies with either demonstrated growth potential or little
appeal to portfolio managers.
While many private equity funds take minority positions, 14 the degree of control
actually sought may be a function of the company's overall development stage, its perfor-
mance, and the circumstances of the surrounding economic context. A fund may be more
inclined to control an investment in a young company with a new management team
than it would an investment in a late stage entity with an established management team.
Generally, private equity funds will want to have a board position and/or the right to par-
ticipate in strategic decisions. This type of investment monitoring stands in sharp con-
trast to the absence of managerial responsibilities or involvement characteristic of portfo-
lio investors. 15
10. Michael Molinski, Private Latin American Equity Funds Attracting Investors (visited Nov. 8,
1999) http://www.latinolink.com/biz/biz97/0131BLAT.HTM.
11. See Patience is Virtue in Dealing with Mexican Businesses, J. CoM., Aug. 31, 1992, at 3A.
12. According to the CEO of BISA, a private equity fund active in Argentina, funds are "there to
make a lot of money for themselves and their investors." Private Equity Funds, Newsletter
(Consulate of Argentina), Mar. 1999 (visited Jan. 5, 2000) http://www.consargtoro.org/
mar99.htmI [hereinafter Consulate Newsletter].
13. Equity stakes obtained can consist of either common, preferred, or convertible preferred
shares.
14. Majority positions can-and are-taken by private equity firms, even though in a strict eco-
nomic sense such action would constitute a "foreign direct investment." Carrasco & Thomas,
supra note 1, at 544. An example of a firm that prefers majority or controlling investment
stakes, particularly with respect to family-run companies, is the Advent International Fund.
See Mark Mulligan, Latin America: Healthy Appetite for Funds (visited Jan. 5, 2000)
http://www.ft.com/ftsurveys/industry/sc2b3a.htm.
15. In this regard, one private equity practitioner notes: "venture capital/private equity investing is
significantly different from passive selection and retention of stock and debt investments by a
money manager." JACK S. LEVIN ET AL., STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY AND
ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 1-3 (1999).
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The private equity investor's corporate governance role may be enhanced by the prac-
tice of targeting companies and sectors with which the fund has prior experience. The ele-
ment of "added value" inherent in a fund's contribution of both managerial and sectoral
expertise, together with its willingness to share in the risk associated with the business ven-
ture, underscores the genuine quality of the fund's commitment to the recipient company.
A private equity fund's ability to provide these benefits in a way that does not substantially
offend the host nation or recipient company's notion of economic or corporate sovereignty
positively serves the long-term interests of all parties to the transaction.
Private equity financing can be applied to a broader range of entities on the commer-
cial continuum than that covered by portfolio investment. For example, a private equity
fund may provide seed or start-up financing for a "zero" or "early" stage entity.16 Venture
capital received from private equity funds can be used to complete the testing and market-
ing of new products or technology and to establish initial manufacturing and distribution
capabilities. 17 Typically ranging from $500,000 to $2 million, zero and early stage transac-
tions are characterized by longer lock-in periods and the uncertainty associated with a new
business concept. 18 To compensate for the elevated degree of illiquidity and risk, high rates
of return are usually required by private equity investors. This reality is reflected in discount
rates that reach as high as thirty-five percent to seventy percent per annum. 19
Alternatively, a private equity fund may invest in an already established, privately
held later stage or middle-market firm.20 Capital invested by private equity firms can be
applied to a variety of ends including the expansion of a firm's plant and equipment, the
development of new products or technology, the strategic acquisition of a related busi-
ness (facilitating industry consolidation), or the realization of a change in ownership or
capital structure by way of a management buy-out (MBO), leveraged buy-out (LBO), or
sale to a third party.
A variant application involves investments in financially distressed companies. These
can be made in either privately held or publicly traded entities. Most private equity
financing available for distressed privately held firms is supplied by specialized "turn-
around partnerships." These groups seek out investments in undervalued companies that
can be subsequently restored to profitability and sold. Turnaround transactions generally
16. Zero stage companies characteristically have a founding management team and may or may
not have developed a business plan, completed a prototype, and engaged in beta testing. Early
stage companies, in contrast, typically have completed beta testing, demonstrated the initial
viability of the concept, and generated minimal revenues. Under normal circumstances early
stage companies have no significant earnings or cash flow. See Cobblestone Private Equity,
L.L.C., Common Venture Capital Terms (visited Nov. 3, 1999) http://www.cobblestone-
pe.com/ven-cap-term.htm [hereinafter Common Venture Capital Terms).
17. See George W. Fenn, Nellie Liang & Stephan Prowse, The Economics of the Private Equity




20. Typical characteristics of later stage or middle market firms are an established, recognized
product and/or market, a history of growth, positive earnings and cash flow, a demonstrated
ability to meet forecasts, strong exports, and a seasoned, capable management team. See
Common Venture Capital Terms, supra note 16.
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range in value from $25 million to $200 million.2 1 When the recipient of private equity
financing is a publicly traded company, the funds are frequently used to supplement
working capital or strengthen balance sheets. The opening up of large, publicly traded
companies to private equity financing can result in a corresponding decrease in the
amount of capital otherwise available for SMSEs.
Last, private equity funds can also play an important role in the provision of short-
term (six to eighteen months) bridge or mezzanine financing. This type of financing usu-
ally occurs in conjunction with a subsequent initial public offering (IPO).
Later stage or middle-market private equity transactions generally range in value
from $2 million to $100 million. 22 Because of the lower levels of uncertainty and shorter
lock-in periods, the rate of return is not as high as that required by investors in zero or
early stage deals. 23 The discount rate used to convert an estimated terminal value to a
present value may range between fifteen percent and forty percent, depending on the cir-
cumstances of the investment. 24
While the exact duration of a private equity investment varies in relation to the
developmental stage, condition, and objective of the recipient, the term typically ranges
from two to ten years, with many investments clustering between the three and seven year
marks. The heightened degree of temporal certainty associated with private equity
financing enables recipient entities and host nations to plan their financial future in a way
superior to that permitted by portfolio investment.
When the objectives of the recipient company have been accomplished, private equi-
ty investors exit the investment either by conducting an IPO or private placement, mak-
ing the company available for acquisition by another company, coordinating a repurchase
of the shares by the company, or arranging for a secondary purchase of the equities by a
third party. Considered from the perspective of a host economy, exits accomplished by
IPO can be doubly beneficial in that they simultaneously increase the volume of trading
and the number of issuers on a local market. This outcome helps host nations with thinly
developed capital markets. As one trade publication notes in this regard, "private equity
funds may play a critical role in increasing the limited number of Latin American issuers
inasmuch as most of these funds aim at exiting their investment through the listing if
their investee companies."25 By way of contrast, portfolio investment impacts the volume
of trading activity on a market, but not the actual number of issuers.
D. AN OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE EQUITY FINANCING IN LATIN AMERICA.
Viewed as the "last step of all things that have come before in Latin America, ' 26
private equity financing has attracted a lot of attention since the mid-1990s. Private
equity funds are considered to be "active new players" 27 that provide "key sources of




25. Danino, supra note 5.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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capital. '28 In what is touted as the arrival of a "second wave" 29 of capital investment,
the amount of capital raised and invested by Latin American-oriented private equity
funds has increased each year from U.S.$107 million in 1992 to over U.S.$8 billion in
1999.30 As a result of high domestic interest rates and restricted access to local and
international capital markets, many Latin American companies have turned to private
equity financing to satisfy their demand for additional capital. As one Brazilian fund
director notes, "there are no other solutions than equity financing." 31
Reflecting the "enormous" 32 nature of its potential, private equity financing in Latin
America has a broad range of commercial applications. Some capital has gone to fund
start-up ventures, and experience in this context indicates that high-tech and e-commerce
firms enjoy a significant competitive advantage.33
28. Consulate Newsletter, supra note 12. As of 1999, the following private equity (including venture
capital) financiers were active in Latin America: AIG-GE Capital Latin American
Infrastructure, L.P., AIG Global Emerging Market Fund, L.P., Aqua International Partners,
BancBoston Capital, Inc., Banco Bozano, Banco Opportunity, Bank of America Equity
Partners, Barings Private Equity Fund, L.P. (Mexico), BISA, Capital Z Partners, Ltd., Central
America Investment Managers, Chase Capital Partners, Citicorp Venture Capital, CVC-
Opportunity Equity Partners, L.P., Darby Overseas Investments, Ltd., Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette, Inc., eQuest Partners, Explorador Capital Management, Exxel Capital Partners V, L.P.,
GP Capital Partners II, L.P., Galicia Advent Private Equity Fund, Gilbert Global Equity
Partners, L.P., Global Environment Emerging Markets Fund It, L.P., Global Private Equity III,
L.P., Grupo Liberman, Guyacon Private Equity Fund, Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst, Inc., IAI
World Fund, L.L.C., Intel Venture Capital for Latin America, Interprise Technology Partners,
L.P. Latin America Capital Partners II, L.P., The Latin America Enterprise Fund, Latin
Healthcare Fund, L.P., Latinvest Asset Management, MBA Private Equity, Merrill Lynch Private
Equity Fund, Newbridge Latin America, L.P., The Mexico Private Equity Fund, L.P., Pactual
Electra Partners, Procorp, Softbank, Southern Cross Group, TCW/Latin America Private
Equity Partners, L.P., Warburg, Pincus Ventures Int'l, L.P., and WestSphere Equity Investors,
L.P. See Felipe Aldunate Montes, El Mapa del Tesoro, AMERICAECONOMIA, Feb. 10, 2000, at 26.
In comparison, there were only twelve funds active in Latin America in 1997. See Judith Evans,
The Search for the Perfect Gift Horse, LATIN FIN., May 1998, at 23.
29. Jan Boyer, El "Private Equity" en America Latina: El Inicio de Una Segunda Ola?,
AMERICAECONOMIA, Oct. 21, 1999, at 62.
30. See JUAN MARTIN AROCENA, SURMOUNTING LEGAL HURDLES IN LATIN AMERICAN DEAL STRUCTURE,
1 (1999) (on file with author). This figure is projected to grow to U.S.$13 billion in 2000. See
also Jorge 0. Mariscal & Kent Hargis, The Latin American Investment Strategist, 7 (Dec. 6,
1999) (report prepared by Goldman Sachs Investment Research, New York) (on file with
author); Evans, supra note 28, at 23.
31. Molinski, supra note 10.
32. See Danino, supra note 5.
33. See Boyer, supra note 29, at 64. Examples of Latin American high-tech, Internet-related start-ups
that have received significant venture capital support are "yupi.com" (U.S.$67.4 million), "dere-
mate.com" (U.S.$12 million), "patagon.com" (U.S.$61 million), "viajo.com" (U.S.$9.3 million),
"sportsya.com" (U.S.$10.8 million). See Isabel Darrigrandi, Susan Segal: La Reina de la Red,
AMERICAECONOMIA, Feb. 10, 2000, at 25. See also Panorama, LATIN TRADE, Mar. 2000, at 13.
Leading private equity investors in high-tech, "dot-coin" Latin American ventures are: Chase
Capital Partners/Flatiron, Grupo Liberman/SLI.COM Ventures One, eQuest Partners, BGS
Venture Capital Fund/Hicks, Muse, Tate, & Furst, Inc. (U.S.$50 million under management),
Explorador.net VC Fund (U.S.$25 million available for investment), Central America
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Notwithstanding the view of some financiers that venture capital is the "most impor-
tant finance tool in Latin America,' 34 this sub-type of private equity constitutes the
smallest amount of investment to date. This situation can be attributed to two primary
factors: (1) the relative paucity of high-tech or Internet companies operating in Latin
America 35 and (2) the perception of the international business community that intellec-
tual property protection and enforcement in Latin America is anemic. 36 Increased
Internet access 37 and respect for intellectual property rights going forward could con-
tribute to an increase in the amount of venture capital invested in Latin America.
38
Investment Managers (U.S.$50 million available for investment), Interprise Technology
Partners, L.P. (U.S.$110 million available for investment), Banco Bozano, Simonsen (U.S.$100
million available for investment in Brazil), Advent International, GP Investimentos (U.S.$1.3
billion total invested, U.S.$200 million of which are specifically invested in Internet projects),
Latinvest Asset Management (administers.U.S.$1.2 billion in Latin America, and U.S.$960 mil-
lion in Brazil), Pactual Electra Partners (U.S.$15 million invested), Westsphere Equity Investors
(U.S.$28 million under administration), Banco Opportunity (U.S.$280 million available for
investment), Intel Venture Capital for Latin America, (approximately U.S.$450 million avail-
able for investment), Softbank Latin America Ventures (U.S.$100 million available for invest-
ment), Citicorp Venture Capital, BancBoston Capital, Southern Cross Group. See Montes,
supra note 28, at 28.
34. Jorge Roldan, Filling a Gap in Latin Corporate Finance, LATIN FIN., Mar. 1997, at 42, available in
LEXIS, Country and Region (excluding U.S.) Library, Mexico File.
35. A telling manifestation of this fact is the relatively low number of patents filed by Latin
American entities in the United States (which action best ensures world ownership). A sharp
contrast in registration practices exists between South Korea (which registers approximately
3,400 patents per year in the United States) and the largest nations of Latin America, none of
which has ever registered more than 100 patents in the United States in a single year (in 1998,
Brazil registered eighty-eight patents, Mexico registered seventy-seven, and Argentina regis-
tered forty-six). See Andres Oppenheimer, Patents Key to New Economy, MIAMI HERALD, Oct.
10, 1999, at A15.
36. See Josh Lerner & Gonzalo Pacanins, Private Equity in Developing Countries (visited Nov. 8,
1999) http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/develop.html.
37. Latin American venture capital providers are excited by projections that the volume of e-com-
merce in Latin America will grow from the current 1998 level of U.S.$167 million per year to
over U.S.$8.3 billion per year by 2003. This represents an annual growth rate of 117 percent.
See Lisa Krochmal, Can the Venture Capital Model Work for Latin America? (visited Jan. 5, 2000)
http://www.latpro.com/articles/venture-capital.htm. Free Internet access in several major
Latin American Nations-including Argentina (i.cero), Brazil (Bradesco, Unibanco, Terra,
amongst others), and Mexico (Terra Libre)-is now a reality. The former free service, i.cero, is
expanding its capacity to Mexico, Colombia, and Ecuador. Free access is expected to drive
greater levels of e-commerce. See Andreas Adriano & Max Alberto Gonzales, Antes y Despues
de Bradesco, AMERICAECONOMIA, Jan. 27, 2000, at 44. In Mexico, Telemex has introduced free
access in conjunction with the purchase of computers through its prodigy Internet plus pro-
gram. See Angelo Young, Mexico's Future on Line, MB, Dec. 1999, at 39.
38. Illustrative of this trend is the recent establishment in Miami of the Tokyo-backed Softbank.
This group will supply venture capital specifically to high-tech companies in Latin America.
See John Dorschner, Softbank Sets Up Fund for Latin Web Ventures, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 14,
2000, at 3C. In the same vein, Grupo Empresarial Bavaria, a Colombian Conglomerate, recent-
ly announced the establishment of a U.S.$ 100 million Latin American investment fund to be
headquartered in Miami. See John Dorschner, Colombian Fund Bets on S. Fla., MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 26, 2000, at IC.
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The lion's share of Latin American private equity financing, on the other hand, has
been invested in "already established firms in traditional industries." 39 Recipient firms
may be in solid financial condition with strong growth potential or financially distressed.
As one private equity financier summarizes: "In Latin America, most of the money has
gone for company buy-outs or late stage investing in ... established companies, rather
than as venture capital to start ups. " 40 The companies that receive this type of financing
are typically not in the high-tech sector, but rather in basic retailing (for example,
Quantec S.A., computers, Chile; Tia, S.A., groceries, Argentina; Comercial Prat, general
retail, Chile; and Microsiga Software of Brazil), manufacturing, and distributing indus-
tries.41 Other favored investment sectors have been financial services, telecommunica-
tions (for example, Telmig Celular of Brazil), energy, insurance (for example, Mass
Seguros of Chile), health care (for example, Provincia and Emergencias, S.A., both of
Argentina), entertainment (Showcenter, S.A. of Argentina, Cines Unidos of Venezuela),
infrastructure42 (for example, Sanepar, water management, Brazil; Santos, port operation,
Brazil; Metro, subways, Brazil; and Tramaca, transportation, Chile), and primary materi-
als (for example, San Miguel, agriculture, Argentina; Desde el Sur, cotton, Argentina;
Abolio y Rubio, dairy, Argentina).
Having specifically targeted companies with extraordinary growth potential and/or
obvious resale potential, the majority of Latin American private equity investments are
exited either by sale to an international strategic investor looking for a foothold in the
region 43 or management buy-out.44 Sales that occur in sectors ripe for consolidation can
engender greater economic efficiency through the introduction of larger scale
operations. 45
. The other principal form of exiting is by way of an IPO on a local exchange. While a
public offering of a company's shares can result in the highest valuation for a company,46
39. Lerner & Pacanins, supra note 36.
40. Molinski, supra note 10.
41. See Fenn et al., supra note 17.
42. See Ariel Kas, Private Equity in Latin America: Regional Leaders (visited Jan. 13, 2000)
http://www.latpor.com/articles/private-equity.htm. Private equity funds should be positioned
to profit, given demand projections for Latin American infrastructure projects on the order of
U.S.$70 billion per year. See Danino, supra note 5.
43. Examples of exit by sale include Exxel's sale of its stake in Supermercados Norte and Hicks,
Muse's sale of its interest in Mandeville Cable Argentina. See Steven P. Galante, Funding Set
Record of $3.6 Billion in '98, but Outlook for '99 Cloudy (visited Jan. 5, 2000) http://www.asse-
talt.com/products/news/lapeastory3.htm.
44. An example of a management buy-out involves Vascal Industria, a Bolivian food and drinks
group. See Mulligan, supra note 14.
45. See Chase Capital Partners, Investment Criteria & Deal Types, Industry
Consolidations/Restructuring Opportunities (visited Nov. 3, 1999) http://ww03.chase.com/glob-
al/ccp/criteria/crit icro.html.
46. See Christopher J. Mailander, Searching for Liquidity: United States Exit Strategies For
International Private Equity Investment, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 71 (1997). While it is often the
case that an IPO will result in the highest valuation, success is by no means guaranteed. In the
wake of the explosion of technology-related IPOs (over 1,000 since 1990), many newly public
entities have languished. As one industry publication relates, of those 1,000-plus domestic
IPOs, almost 200 have price/earnings multiples below twenty, and approximately 300 are trad-
ing below their offering price. See David G. Barry et al., As Technology Industry Matures, Firms
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the actual potential for accomplishing this sort of exit in Latin America is limited.
Generally considered, institutional investors that purchase Latin American stocks focus
on the issues of a handful of top-tier industrial conglomerates, as opposed to unknown
companies with relatively short performance records. 47 The negative consequences of this
focus are exacerbated by the fact that most Latin American equity markets lack sufficient
liquidity48 for smaller domestic issuers to make successful offerings. In the view of one
regional business publication, "with the exception of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, the
markets of other Latin American economies are either too small or too unstable to be
considered potential destinations'
49
An increasingly popular alternative is to offer shares on an exchange in a developed
country.50 For example, a Latin American company may do a private placement in the
United States pursuant to Regulation D or a public offering. 5 1 Although such action does
not directly contribute to the development of a Latin American nation's securities market,
it is a nonetheless desirable outcome in that it helps Latin American enterprises beat the
capital squeeze and bolsters the notion of rigorous financial reporting in Latin American
business culture. Recent examples of private equity financed transactions that eventually
went to a foreign market include Terra Networks, S.A. (an Internet company active in
Latin America whose shares are traded on the NASDAQ), 52 El Sitio.com (an Argentine-
See Buyout Opportunities (visited Jan. 5, 1999) http://www.assetalt.com/ped/techfund.htm.
This fact did not stop the realization of fifty-seven IPOs in the month of November alone last
year, most of which were Internet-related. Nor did this fact prevent VA Linux Systems' stock
from soaring 733 percent in value on its first day of trading. John Dorschner, When Will the
Madness End, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 15, 1999, at IC.
47. It is significant in this connection that no recently established Latin American Internet compa-
ny has issued stock on a local exchange. See Eduardo Garcia, Mexico May Ease Rules for Stock
Listings, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 26, 2000, at 2C.
48. Latin American stock markets have historically had concentrated capitalizations, few compa-
nies, and a low turnover ratio. As of the end of 1995, the capitalization held by the ten largest
stocks in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico represented, respectively, 47.5 percent, 37.1 per-
cent, 36.5 percent, and 36.5 percent of the market. See Vernava, supra note 6, at 123.
49. John Watling, Invest in Mexico Now, MB, Mar. 1999, at 35. This said, Advent, one of the most
powerful private equity groups operating in Latin America, has succeeded in bringing more
than one hundred of its investments public on fifteen different stock exchanges. See Kas, supra
note 42.
50. Internet-related high-tech companies that issued shares in the United States during 1999 par-
ticipated in a record-breaking performance in terms of the average return for IPOs at the end
of the pricing year. Prior to 1999, the highest average return for an IPO at the end of its pric-
ing year was 28 percent. In 1999, the average return for all IPOs was 82 percent. For Internet-
related shares, this percentage jumped to 165 percent. See Dorschner, supra note 38. Financial
analysts believe this level of performance to be unsustainable going forward. Pointing to the
continued non-profitability of internet-related companies with publicly traded shares, many
investment professionals are expecting a substantial industry shake-out. See John Dorschner,
Internet Stocks Surf on Thin Ice, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 2000, at A 1.
51. See John J. Mckenna, Private Equity Market is Hot with Equity Capital Alternatives, Hous. Bus.
J., July 6, 1998 (visited Nov. 8, 1999) http://www/amcity.com/houston/stories/1998/07/06
/smallb7.html.
52. See Montes, supra note 28, at 26.
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based Internet portal whose shares are traded on the NASDAQ), 53 Impsat (an Argentine
Internet infrastructure company whose shares are traded on the NASDAQ), 54 and
StarMedia Networks, Inc. (one of the biggest Internet portals in Latin America; its shares
are traded on NASDAQ and STRM). 5 5 Private equity funded companies that have
announced future plans to issue shares, principally on the NASDAQ, 5 6 include
Yupi.com, 57 LatinStocks.com (a Buenos Aires-based Internet financial services
company),5 8 Patagon.com Int'l Ltd. (founded by Argentines, this Internet site provides
personal financial services for Latin American users),59 MercadoLibre, S.A. (an Argentine
on-line market site), 60 and UOL (a Brazilian ISP with localized Web portals in the United
States, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico). 6 1 An example of a private equity trans-
action that did a private placement is UOL. 62
Possible divesting difficulties aside, experience has shown that "pioneer" equity ven-
tures involving Latin American SMSEs can yield significant economic, social, and finan-
cial benefits.6 3 Positive regional GDP growth rates, combined with internal rates of return
on the order of thirty to fifty percent (117 percent in one case64 ) have attracted the atten-
tion of U.S. private equity funds, many of which are presently flush with cash 65 and anx-
ious to replicate their successes in new lands.66 This attraction is, in turn, strengthened by
53. Id.
54. See John Lyons, Argentine Web Start-Up Nets $195.5 Million in IPO, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 2,
2000, at C2.
55. See Montes, supra note 28, at 26.
56. This practice is characteristic of the so-called "New Economy,' wherein the old-line industrial
and service companies of the Dow Jones are considered to be representative of the past, and
the technology firms of the NASDAQ composite Index are thought to auger the future. Said
dynamic has been described as a "massive structural shift in the U.S. economy." Gregg Fields,
Dow Jones Slides Below 10,000, Hints at New Economy, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 26, 2000, at Al.
57. See Gregg Fields, Spanish Web Portal Yupi Files for U.S.$172M Stock Offering, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 20, 2000, at C1.
58. See Panorama, supra note 33, at 11. This company is controlled by Exxel, a large Argentine pri-
vate equity group.
59. See Darrigrandi, supra note 33, at 25.
60. See id.
61. See Panorama, supra note 33, at 12.
62. UOL recently raised U.S.$ 100 million through a placement to a group of institutional investors
headed by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. See UOL Da el Salto, AMERICAECONOMIA, Oct.
21, 1999, at 8.
63. MIF Urges Equity Investment in Small Businesses in Latin America, (Rel. Inter-American
Development Press) (visited Feb. 24, 1998) http://www.iadb.org/exr/PRENSA/
1998/cp3198e.htm [hereinafter MIF].
64. See Evans, supra note 28, at 23. The 117 percent internal rate of return earned by U.S. buy-out
firm Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst in an Argentine cablevision transaction helps substantiate MIT
professor Rudiger Dornbusch's claim that equity investments in Latin America can lead to
"high growth rates and big time profits.' MIF, supra note 63.
65. Having raised U.S.$54 billion in 1997 alone, the U.S. private equity market currently has a
tremendous quantity of money to invest. See Mckenna, supra note 51.
66. See Roldan, supra note 34, at 42.
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U.S. investors' demonstrated interest in purchasing and holding foreign securities67 and
the diminishing average rates of return being realized in U.S. (domestic) private equity
investments.68 A recent report by Goldman Sachs quantifies this trend by pointing out
that between 1992 and 1995 the percentage of international private equity investments
increased from zero percent to 5.8 percent of all alternative investments. "In a few short
years, participation in this asset class went from ... zero to 51%."69 The Goldman Sachs
report concludes by identifying international private equity investment as the asset class
that will deliver the highest future returns.
E. THE POTENTIAL FOR PRIVATE EQUITY FINANCING IN MEXICO.
Consistent with the experience of its Latin American neighbors, private equity
financing in Mexico has increased steadily since the mid-1990s. 70 According to the find-
ings of one study, Mexico has received approximately U.S.$1.7 billion in private equity
funding.7 1 This figure represents approximately nine percent of all capital raised by Latin
American private equity funds and 17.3 percent of the total value of all deals closed in the
67. See J. Carter Beese, Jr., Reengineering Regulation: Maintaining the Competitiveness of the United
States Capital Markets, 18 WASH. Q. 133 (1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews
File. U.S. investors have historically shown "little interest in holding equity positions in foreign
companies. However, with the dramatic growth of U.S. mutual funds and pension funds over
the last decade, these institutional investors have begun to increase the allocation of their hold-
ings dedicated to foreign equities." Between 1980 and 1994 foreign equity investment by U.S.
investors increased from U.S.$17.9 billion to over U.S.$850 billion. Id.
68. The average rate of return on a U.S. (domestic) private equity investment has declined from
approximately forty percent in the 1970s to a current approximate rate of twenty percent. This
rate is expected to drift further downwards to seventeen or eighteen percent. See Molinski,
supra note 10.
69. Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Frank Russel Capital, Inc., 1995 Survey of Alternative Investments
by Pension Funds, Endowments, and Foundations, New York, 1996, cited in Lerner & Pacanins,
supra note 36.
70. It should be noted that the concept of venture capital (capital de riesgo) is not totally foreign to
Mexico. For some time, the government has used the Sociedad de Inversion de Capital de Riesgo
(venture capital societies, or SINCAs) to promote investment in specified regions or entrepre-
neurial activities. These societies are distinguishable, however, from private equity funds in
several basic respects. First, the source of their capital is primarily the government, as opposed
to the private sector. Second, their organization is open-ended, unlike the close-ended nature
of U.S. private equity funds. Last, the goal of the society has not been to take the recipient
company public but, rather, to plow profits back into the company. As of 1997, there were
about fifty SINCAs operating in Mexico, with total assets of N$2.8 billion. Of this money,
approximately eighty percent was invested in companies, eighteen percent in fixed-income
securities, and two percent in other assets. See Baron F. Levin, A New Player in the Market,
BUSINESS MEXICO, Apr. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, Country & Region (excluding U.S.), Mexico,
Country Reports.
71. See Capital de Riesgo/Capital de Desarollo en Mexico y Latinoamerica: Fortnas de Participacion,
paper presented at conference on "Capital de Desarollo en Mexico" (Nov. 10-11, 1999)
Veracruz, Mexico [hereinafter Capital de Riesgo/Desarollo].
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region between 1996 and 1997.72 Responding to this growth, the number of private equi-
ty funds operating in Mexico has gone from zero to approximately fifteen. 73
The increasing importance of private equity in Mexico 74 reflects the existence of
local conditions favorable to its florescence. Relative to investment opportunities in either
the United States or other economies, many companies in Mexico are undervalued by as
much as twenty percent.75 As Jorge Mariscal, the head of emerging markets strategy at
Goldman Sachs notes, "a quick look at the Mexican market shows it is undervalued rela-
tive to any measure you choose."7 6 Attracted by the potential for valuation increases of up
to twenty percent and thirty percent, 77 foreign investors have begun to purchase large
shares of these private companies. 78
The near collapse of the Mexican banking system 79 and the consequential drying up
of productive credit has also contributed to the increased interest in private equity. With
interest rates as high as thirty to forty percent,80 commercial credit initially slowed to a
trickle and then actually shrank. As a leading business publication points out, "financing
by commercial banks to the private sector has contracted every year" since Mexico's
devaluation-driven financial crisis in 1995.81 In this spartan credit environment, compa-
nies desperate to meet their financing needs and/or survive are willing to absorb the rela-
tively high costs associated with private equity financing.
Another factor conducive to private equity financing in Mexico involves the nation's
positive long-term macroeconomic growth prospects. Average post-NAFTA foreign direct
72. See id.
73. Private equity funds with Mexican operations include: Advent International Corporation,
BancBoston Capital, Inc., Barings Private Equity Partners (Mexico), Chase Capital Partners,
Communications Equity Associates, Ltd., Darby Overseas Investments, Ltd., GE Capital Corp.,
GFB Capital Partners, Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst, Inc., the Latin American Enterprise Fund,
Latin American Private Equity Investments, the Mexico Private Equity Fund, L.P., Newbridge
Latin America, Procorp, TCW/Latin American Partners, L.L.C., Westsphere Equity Investors,
L.P., and Zemi Investments, L.P. See Levin, supra note 70.
74. In this vein, one financial writer recently observed that private equity investors are a "new
breed of investor" that have "perceptibly" changed the nature of investing in Mexico. See Jean
Michael Enriquez, Recurring Legal Issues for Private Equity Funds in Mexico, Aug. 15, 1999 (vis-
ited Nov. 12, 1999) http://www.wtexec.com/mf081599.html.
75. See Watling, supra note 49, at 33. While this statement was based on the analysis of P/E ratios
of companies whose stock is publicly traded in Mexico, it also constitutes an accurate charac-
terization of the relative value of Mexico's privately held corporations.
76. See Watling, supra note 49, at 33
77. See Watling, supra note 49, at 35.
78. See Financial Flows and the Developing Countries, World Bank Doc. (1997) (report prepared by
the Int'l Finance Division of the Int'l Econ. Dept. of the World Bank) at 23 (1997).
79. The FOBAPROA bailout cost over U.S.$80 billion. This amount-representing approximately
fifteen percent of Mexican GDP-has become public debt. See Ricardo Sandoval, Audit Faults
Mexican Government, MIAMI HERALD, July 22, 1999.
80. See Bustos, supra note 9, at 22.
81. Baron F. Levin, Where Credit's Due, MB, May 1999, at 18. In the wake of this crisis, Mexico
realized that it needed to attract more capital to the system. Mike Lubrano, Foreign Investment
in the Financial Sector of Mexico, 6 U.S. MEXICO L.J. 81, 84 (1998).
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investment of over $10 billion per year, combined with strong GDP growth82 over the
same period has made Mexico the fourth fastest growing economy amongst the world's
thirty largest economies. 83 The fact that Mexico's economy is expected to "post the best
growth rates in all of Latin America in the coming years"84 appeals to investors whose
ultimate return is a function of both a recipient company's profitability and the econo-
my's long-term vitality.
The last condition, giving rise to increased private equity financing in Mexico
involves the effect of ongoing pension fund reform. 85 Mexico's newly privatized pension
fund management system (Administradora de los Fondos de Retiro, or AFORES) has until
now been limited to the ownership of one mutual fund.86 Liberalization of the number of
mutual funds that can be owned by AFORES, coupled with a grant of authority to invest
in a wider range of instruments including the stock market,87 will simultaneously deepen
the capitalization of Mexico's market and enhance the attractiveness of going public. The
recent opening up of Mexico's insurance industry and health care system dovetails per-
fectly with this dynamic insofar as stepped up reliance on private insurance coverage
could result in greater levels of portfolio investment in local companies by increasingly
well-capitalized insurance companies.
An important corollary to the aforementioned investment conditions is the overall
growth potential for private equity financing in Mexico. Indicative of this potential is the
fact that in spite of being the region's second largest economy, Mexico has only received
17.3 percent of total Latin American private equity financing. This share is much less than
that received by nations with significantly smaller economies (for example, Argentina and
Chile). 88 As international investors continue their entry "into new market niches, such as
financing small and medium companies,' 89 it is reasonable to think that Mexico will be
the recipient of a more proportional share of total private equity investment.
In this last connection, it should be noted that there is no shortage of investment
opportunities for private equity funds in Mexico. Recent econometric data indicates that
approximately 2,000 small and 50090 medium-sized businesses have a combined demand
82. See GDP growth for Mexico is forecast at 3.86, MEXICO WEEKLY FAX BULLETIN (Orbis Pub., LLC),
Dec. 27, 1999, at 1.
83. See SHCP Report, supra note 2.
84. Watling, supra note 49, at 35.
85. Mexico's retirement and pension system has undergone substantial transformation since 1996.
"Decreto de Ley de los Sistemas de Ahorropara el Retiro y de Reformas y Adiciones a las leyes
Generales de Instituciones y Sociedades Mutualistas de Seguros, para Regular las Agrupaciones
Financieras, de Instituciones de Credito, del Mercado de Valores y Federal Proteccion al
Consumidor," D.O., May 23, 1996. "Reglamento de la Ley de los Sistemas de Ahorro para el
Retiro," D.O., Oct. 12, 1996, as amended Jan. 20, 1998.
86. These funds tend to be heavily invested in government and rated private sector securities. See
Rogers et al., The Restructuring of Mexican Financial Services and Application of Chapter 14 of
NAFTA, 7 U.S. MEXICO L.J. 67, 71 (1999).
87. See id.
88. See Capital de Riesgo/Desarollo, supra note 71. Argentina's share of total Latin American pri-
vate equity financing is 28.7 percent, while Chile has successfully attracted approximately 26.3
percent of the available funds.
89. Rogers et al., supra note 86, at 71.
90. See Boyer, supra note 29, at 64.
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for private equity totaling between $7.2 and $8 billion.9 1 Private equity financing can be
used, inter alia, for financing start-up companies, restructuring corporate liabilities,
expansion, acquisitions, and the direct capitalization of economic groups of all sizes. 92
Specific economic activities and/or sectors in Mexico that have already received private
equity include light industry (Vidrio Formas, Collado), retail (Latin Americano, S.A. de
C.V.), food and beverage (La Corona/Grupo Corvi, Grupo Embottelladora Sureste,
Fomento Alimenticos), infrastructure, health care, entertainment (Cinemex, S.A.), and
high-tech or Internet-based entities.93
From the foregoing it is evident that there exists a tremendous unrealized potential for
private equity investment in Mexico. As noted by the investment community, SMSEs in
Mexico present an "outstanding opportunity to couple the strengths of local innovation
with foreign capital."94 This paper will explore the practical issues, challenges, risks, and
rewards associated with that potential from the perspective of a North American investor.
Because private equity strategies and techniques developed in the United States can-
not always be directly applied to investments elsewhere, a large part of this paper is
directed to the prudent structuring of private equity transactions in the context of
Mexico's legal, political, social, and economic environment. Specific structuring aspects
addressed include the realization of due diligence, the drafting and execution of the
investment agreement, and fundamental exit strategies. As a basic analytical proposition,
this investigation carries forth from the perspective of a minority stakeholder, unless oth-
erwise noted. The reason for this qualification is that majority shareholders, by virtue of
their investment, have all the control they should need to protect their investment and
realize its objectives. 95 Accordingly, many of the issues that are potentially problematic in
private equity transactions never arise. To the extent they are available, actual examples of
transaction structuring in Mexico will be provided.
Having looked at the legal steps and mechanisms entailed in a private equity transac-
tion, this paper concludes by identifying the special risks and challenges associated with
private equity transactions in Mexico. Where available, means of mitigating against said
risks are noted. The final part of the conclusion offers a series of observations and recom-
mendations, the implementation of which will facilitate the optimal future development
of private equity financing in Mexico.
91. See Capital de Riesgo/Desarollo, supra note 71.
92. See Capital de Ricago/Desarollo, supra note 71.
93. See Jack S. Levin et al., supra note 15. See also Kas, supra note 42.
94. Rafael X. Zahralddin & C. Todd Jones, Venture Capital Opportunities and Mexican
Telecommunications After the Passage of NAFTA and the Ley de Inversion Extranjera, 20 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 899, 902 (1995).
95. In this spirit, the head of Morgan Capital's private equity group notes that "investing as a
minority investor is a much bigger challenge than being able to take a controlling stake." A
Private Affair, LATIN FIN., Dec. 1998, available in LEXIS, Country and Region (excluding U.S.),
Mexico, News.
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II. Structuring Private Equity Transactions in Mexico.
A. PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTORS.
Private equity firms manage portfolios consisting of legally discrete investments, the
majority of which are organized as limited partnerships. 96 These limited partnerships
often have a contractually fixed lifetime of ten years. This period can, by agreement, be
extended in one or two-year increments up to a maximum period of four years. 97 These
funds may either have an affiliation with a larger financial institution or be an indepen-
dent "boutique."98 Acting as financial "intermediaries," limited partnerships are responsi-
ble for the management of approximately eighty percent of all private equity investment.
Typically a fund invests no more than ten percent of the aggregate value of its portfolio
into a single deal. Most of these funds are American, 99 although several regionally orient-
ed firms have emerged over the last few years (for example, Buenos Aires, Sao Paolo, Rio
de Janeiro, and Mexico City). 00 Some funds have also begun to base their operations out
of offshore money havens such as the Cayman Islands. 101
U.S. private equity limited partnerships are composed of general and limited part-
ners. The number of total partners may be kept small so as to exempt the limited partner-
ship from unnecessary Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation. 102 The
general partners assume professional responsibility for raising, making, managing, and
exiting investments. As a result of the Small Business Investment Incentive Act's redefini-
tion of private equity partnerships as "Business Development Companies," general part-
ners are not governed by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.103
The primary purpose of the limited partners, on the other hand, is to invest money and
earn a return. Outside of these functions, limited partners are often specifically prohibited
from taking an active role in the management of the investment. 104 Typical U.S. limited
partners are pension funds (both public and corporate), endowments and foundations,
bank holding companies, insurance companies, investment banks, and high net worth indi-
96. See TERRENCE M. O'TOOLE & MITCHELL S. PRESSER, SUCCESSFUL PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING 12
(1989). Private equity funds can also organize their investments as S-corporations or LLCs.
Because these forms of organization are used less frequently, this paper focuses on issues relat-
ing to the LP.
97. SeeFenn et al., supra note 17.
98. See Fenn et al., supra note 17, at 6.
99. See Molinski, supra note 10.
100. Mexico already has several local "fondos paises" and more are expected to be established. See
Pablo Bachelet, Mexico: Senales de Cambio, AMERICAECONOMIA, Mar. 9, 2000, at 26. Beyond
this hemisphere private equity funds operate in Europe and, to a lesser extent, Asia. Private
equity investments in Asia can be problematic insofar as the majority of firms in the region are
mandatorily structured as corporations, rather than the more beneficial LP. See Lerner &
Pacanins, supra note 36.
101. See Molinski, supra note 10.
102. See id.
103. Fenn et al., supra note 17.
104. See id.
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viduals or families.10 5 Pension funds have provided approximately forty percent of total
investable capital with the remainder being equally split between the other sources.
10 6
Having invested their money, with the expectation that risk adjusted returns on pri-
vate equity investments are greater than the risk adjusted returns on other investments,
private equity limited partnerships generally require rates of return ranging from fifty
percent for an early stage deal to twenty-five percent for a later stage transaction. 107 These
elevated rates of return can be enhanced insofar as taxes are "typically paid not at the
fund level, but rather by individual general and limited partners."'1 8 This pass through
taxation scheme "enables tax exempt investors to avoid almost all tax obligations."1
0 9
1. The Partnership Agreement.
Due to the inherent risk associated with international investments of this type, it is
important that there be a functional relationship and clear understanding between the
general and limited partners. The primary mechanism for accomplishing this end is
through a written partnership agreement.
Because limited partners forego virtually all control over the management of an
investment, there is a great potential for conflict within the partnership. To discourage
general partner opportunism, private equity funds carefully ensure that the general part-
ner's overall compensation is properly aligned with the interests of the limited partners.
In this connection, the general and limited partners together determine the general part-
ner's management fee percentage and associated carried interest (i.e., their share of part-
nership profits). A general partner's management fee will usually be between one percent
and three percent of any profit earned, while the carried interest tends to be in the vicini-
ty of twenty percent."10 Compensation can be in the form of cash, stock, options, or a
combination thereof.1 1 1 By directly tying the general partner's compensation to the per-
formance of the investment in this way, limited partners can be reasonably sure their
interests will be reflected in management's decisions and actions.
While the partnership agreement is the basic vehicle for ordering the relations and
rights between general and limited partners, other steps can be taken. For example, gener-
al and limited partners may negotiate and enter into collateral and security covenants,
thereby limiting the amount of partnership capital that can be invested in one firm, pre-
cluding investments in ventures that deviate from the partnership's main focus, and man-
dating the immediate disbursement of funds on receipt.
105. See id. To tis pool must be added U.S. government foreign aid organizations (USAID), quasi-
governmental corporations (OPIC), multilateral financial institutions (for example, the IFC), and
national development banks (for example, NAFINSA in Mexico). These government-related
investors may measure the return on their investments more in terms of democracy and develop-
ment rather than dollars. See Nacional Financiera, U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce Sign
Cooperation Agreement (visited Jan. 5,2000) http: www.usmcoc.org/rel10598.html.
106. See Lerner & Pacanins, supra note 36.




111. The Incentive Stock Option Law of 1981 made the use of options more attractive by deferring
the tax liability to the time of sale, as opposed to the time of option exercise. See id.
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Limited partners may also successfully negotiate for and obtain oversight and control
rights. The obtainment of an oversight role entails belonging to an advisory board of lim-
ited power. Control rights, conversely, can be quite significant insofar as they may give the
limited partners the ability to vote on the removal of a general partner or the termination
of the partnership before its scheduled date. General partners zealously resist the granting
of these rights. '' 2
B. DEAL SELECTION.
The first step in a private equity transaction is investment selection. This screening
process may focus on targets within a specific niche'13 or, alternatively, range broadly
over market segments 114 and industries. 115 Given the increased interest in private equity
financing, the market for investment opportunities has become more competitive. In the
view of one trade publication," private equity firms are lining up at the trough in search
of the tastiest deals." 116
Although private equity funds may receive hundreds of leads from a variety of
sources (including entrepreneurs, lawyers, accountants, bankers, consultants, etc.), many
fund managers prefer to select investments on the basis of personal knowledge of and
prior experience with the target. Funds affiliated with an investment banking operation
have the advantage of being able to consider companies controlled by groups or people
with whom the organization has a standing relationship. In this regard, the managing
director of JP Morgan's private equity fund notes, "we try to limit our activity to investing
in businesses which we feel extremely comfortable with the controlling shareholders;...
we take a lot of comfort from investing with people that we feel will protect our interests
over the period of our investment.' 117
Absent the ability to generate new investments from prior relationships, a fund has no
choice but to reach investment decisions on the basis of factors such as the "chemistry"
between the parties, its impression of the company's commitment, drive, honesty, reputa-
tion, and creativity, and, most importantly, the results of the due diligence investigation.
The last point on the subject of investment selection involves the physical location of
a fund. Funds with a physical presence in the country that they target will be more
attuned to recent developments and opportunities than a fund based outside the target
country. As the chief executive of one of the few private equity funds with its headquar-
ters in Latin America notes, "if you're not down here you don't really know what's going
112. See id.
113. As one industry publication notes: "another trend is concentration on one kind of investment.
. funds are taking a focused investment approach, concentrating, for example, on insurance,
health care, ... and in the case of a Venezuelan fund, the restaurant sector." Evans, supra note
28, at 23.
114. Some firms limit their investments to deals of a certain minimum size. See id.
115. It is usually larger funds that have the ability and resources to diversify their investment scope
in this way. See id.
116. Id.
117. A Private Affair, supra note 95. As shall be taken up, some investors view an established rela-
tionship as the most effective means of avoiding litigation in local courts.
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on." 118 Having the advantage of being a first mover in a market that is increasingly com-
petitive can be significant.
C. GENERAL DUE DILIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS.
After successfully narrowing the field of potential investments, private equity fund
managers engage in the critical process of due diligence. "Partnership managers receive
hundreds of investment proposals. To be successful, they must be able to select efficiently
the 1% of those proposals that they invest in each year."119 An effective due diligence pro-
gram will critically evaluate the company, its management, the industry, the legislative
environment, and the country in relation to the fund's investment criteria and objectives.
Due diligence is a detail-rich and time-consuming process 120 that can constitute a
significant transaction cost. To protect their economic interests, fund managers may
attempt to negotiate a letter of intent (LOI) containing, inter alia, a "no-shop" provision
obligating the parties to deal exclusively with one another for the duration of the investi-
gation. Alternatively, fund managers may consider including in a LOI an expense reim-
bursement provision allocating financial responsibility for the costs of the due diligence
in the event the transaction ultimately falls through. While this tactic has met with suc-
cess in the United States, it is not widely used in Mexican transactions.
The preliminary and non-binding nature of the LOI should be expressly noted, lest a
court find it to be an enforceable agreement. This said, however, the LOI may, to the
extent it represents the high degree of the parties' commitment, be extremely useful when
dealing with government agencies in subsequent stages of the investment. LOIs are usual-
ly drafted by the fund and countersigned by the representative of the target company.
Because due diligence is prodding and invasive, the process can pose a problem with
respect to small to medium-sized commercial enterprises in Latin America. Having often been
run in the same way by a single family (or group of families) for generations, the typical small
to medium-sized entity may be unfamiliar with and/or hostile to the rules, procedures and
timetables entailed in a private equity fund's due diligence. Moreover, as a result of not previ-
ously having had to open itself up to outside examination, many of these firms may not be
accustomed to sharing otherwise secret information with non-family members. 121 As one
118. Mulligan, supra note 14.
119. Fenn et al., supra note 17.
120. Private equity related due diligence may be more challenging than due diligence in other
financing transactions due to the fact that most of the targets are closely held companies about
which there is little publicly available information. See id.
121. See Boyer, supra note 29, at 62. The importance of this socio-cultural phenomenon for busi-
ness dealings cannot be underestimated. Statistical studies have identified the significant level
of distrust that Latin Americans have for one another and their leaders. See Marta Lagos,
Public Opinion in New Democracies: Latin America's Smiling Mask, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1997, at
128. As Ilya Adler points out, the economic development of Mexico can, in part, be linked to
this tendency: " ... societies with low levels of trust, such as Mexico, are less likely to spawn
large corporations, whereas societies with high trust levels, such as the U.S. and Canada, are
capable of organizing themselves into large, private enterprises. In low trust societies, busi-
nesses tend to be family centered precisely because others can not be trusted." Ilya Adler,
Family Affair, Bus. MEx., Oct. 1998, at 18. U.S. private equity funds should always keep in
mind that business relationships in Mexico are not casually formed. Rather, they are the end
product of a long and substantial period of meetings and familiarization.
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Mexican economist notes, "family-owned firms.., are extremely reluctant to give any infor-
mation ... not out of dishonesty, but out of a parochial attitude.'"122 Echoing this thought, a
senior analyst at a Mexico City brokerage house, adds: "It's a problem of culture. It's a very
dosed culture "' 123
Where there is an existing relationship-and consequently less of a concern about
the transparency of the target company's operations-this problem may be sidestepped.
Absent such a relationship, however, requests for detailed information from a company
with whom the fund has no standing relationship may not be well received. To mitigate
the effects of any cultural collision, fund managers may execute a confidentiality agree-
ment covering the substance of the due diligence investigation. 124 By providing an
enhanced level of security and comfort, fund managers might be more successful in
obtaining full disclosure and cooperation.
The efficient selection of private equity deals may be described as "more art than sci-
ence" and heavily dependent on the "acumen of the general partners."'125 Often, fund
managers possess specialized professional knowledge of the target company's industry, to
the partnership's benefit. Irrespective of such specialized knowledge, however, fund man-
agers should always conduct due diligence investigations in person and with the assis-
tance of legal and accounting counsel familiar with local business customs and norms. 
12 6
An effective due diligence program can produce two important results. First, by
uncovering concealed facts it can help a fund avoid unnecessarily risky, problematic, or
approval-contingent deals. Second, properly conducted due diligence can flush out prob-
lems and/or issues that bear on the negotiation of the subsequent term sheet, investment
agreement, and deal valuation.
Depending on the circumstances of a contemplated investment, the entire process
may be accomplished in as little time as a few weeks or as long as several months. The due
diligence process usually takes longer to complete for Latin American companies than it
does for U.S. entities. 12
7
122. Patience is Virtue in Dealing with Mexican Businesses, supra note 11.
123. Id.
124. Confidentiality agreements can be drafted to (1) limit the access of certain people to informa-
tion pertaining to the contemplated deal; (2) commit the parties to the agreement to an
extended period of confidentiality in the event the transaction falls through; and (3) provide
for the return of previously disclosed material or information upon the occurrence of certain
events.
125. Lerner & Pacanins, supra note 36. U.S. investors should always refer to the following "cardinal
rules" of due diligence: "(1) Never accept the first answer you get to a question; (2) Never
assume anything is done unless you have seen it yourself; and (3) Never assume the rules are
the same for two transactions." Andrew D. Soussloff & Frank H. Golay, Jr., Conducting Due
Diligence Investigations in Securities Offerings by Non-U.S. Issuers, in CONDUCTING DUE
DILIGENCE 533 (L. Markus Wiltshire & K. Hudson Zrike eds., 1999).
126. The involvement of local professional counsel for the purpose of conducting due diligence is
essential insofar as many fund managers "do not have a clue about" Latin America. Evans,
supra note 28, at 23. On the other hand, fund managers should be careful not to rely too heav-
ily on input of local advisors. An unnamed New York private equity ftind did this only to end
up "pouring money into a black hole of debt with no apparent escape route." Mulligan, supra
note 14.
127. Evans, supra note 28, at 23.
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D. MEXICO-SPECIFIC DUE DILIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS.
Effective due diligence in Mexico requires, at a minimum, understanding the sub-
stance and application of Mexico's foreign investment and corporate laws. Depending on
the objectives of the investment, the scope of the due diligence investigation may be
expanded to include Mexico's intellectual property, environmental, and antitrust laws.
Certain aspects of said regulations may be informed and/or superseded by Mexico's
regional and supra-national obligations (under NAFTA, the OAS, the WTO, etc.). Recent
jurisprudencia from Mexico's Supreme Court confirms the superior position of interna-
tional treaties and obligations relative to federal laws. 128 Given the legal complexities
associated with a Mexican due diligence program, the involvement of local legal counsel
is highly recommended. The following subsections identify and evaluate the basic consid-
erations that should be part of a Mexican due diligence program.
1. Foreign Investment Framework.
Foreign investment may participate in any proportion (up to 100 percent) in the cap-
ital stock of a Mexican company.129 This said, however, fund managers must evaluate the
particular activity associated with a contemplated investment in relation to the specific
limitations set forth in articles 5-9 of Mexico's Foreign Investment Law (Ley de Inversi6n
Extranjera, or FIL). Under the aforementioned articles, foreign investment may be exclu-
sively reserved to the state, reserved to Mexican companies with foreigner exclusion claus-
es, 130 restricted to a predetermined percentage not exceeding forty-nine percent, 131 or
subject to the favorable authorization of the Foreign Investment Commission (Comisi6n
Nacional de Inversi6n Extranjera, or CNIE).132
In addition to these potential limitations, Mexico's FIL can impose other obligations.
For example, CNIE authorization is mandatory with respect to foreign participation
greater than forty-nine percent (1) in the economic activities and companies enumerated
in article 8 of the FIL or (2) when the value of the total assets of the target company
exceed the amount annually established by the CNIE.133 The CNIE must rule on requests
128. "Tratados Internacionales. Se Ubican Jerarquicamente por Encima de las Leyes Federales y en
Segundo Piano Respeto de la Constitucion Federal," 10 J.S.C. 46 (9a 6poca 1999) (visited Apr.
10, 2000) http://www.legal.infosel.com.
129. "Ley de Inversion Extranjera," D.O., 27 de diciembre de 1993, as amended by, D.O., 24 de
diciembre de 1996, art. 4 [hereinafter FILl. Mexico's 1993 FIL repealed the more foreign
investment adverse 1973 FIL (which capped foreign participation at forty-nine percent).
Those aspects of the 1989 Reglamentos to the 1973 FIL not inconsistent with the 1993 FIL con-
tinue in force and effect.
130. Id. art. 6.
131. Id. art. 7.
132. Id. arts. 8 & 9. The FIL does set forth specific rules for neutral investments (participation that
results in economic benefits but no right to vote in ordinary general shareholders meetings).
These rules are not addressed, as it is an analytical assumption of this paper that private equity for-
eign investment will entail the right to meaningfully participate in the corporation's governance.
133. Id. art. 9. The current general threshold is approximately N$712 million. Telephone Interview
with Lic. Jorge Ogarrio Kalb, partner, Ogarrio & Diaz, S.C. (Apr. 2, 2000). Pursuant to NAFTA,
the threshold amount effective between 1997 and 1999 was U.S.$50 million. [Investing in
Mexico Today (1999) (report prepared by Santamarina y Steta, Mexico) (on file with author)].
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for authorization within forty-five days. If no response is made within this time, the
request is deemed approved by operation of law.134 Failure to obtain this authorization
can result in the imposition of a fine ranging between 1000 to 5000 daily Mexico City
minimum wages.1
35
Another administrative aspect of Mexico's FIL that fund managers may find burden-
some is article 32. Under this provision, participation of foreign investment in Mexican
companies must be registered at the CNIE within forty days of an investment. 1
36
Compliance with this obligation is the responsibility of the foreign investor, and failure
can result in a fine ranging between 30 and 100 daily Mexico City minimum wages.13 7
At present, there are no restrictions on remittances or repatriations out of Mexico. 138
Moreover, U.S. investors are guaranteed national treatment with respect to the establish-
ment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, sale, or other disposition
of an investment.
139
2. Understanding the Target Company.
A fund manager's due diligence must also examine the target company's organiza-
tion, capital structure, corporate governance, financial condition, and overall legal posi-
tion. Key areas of inquiry are presented below.
a. Corporate Organization.
Information about the target company's organization may be found in its organiza-
tional instrument (escritura constitutiva). This document (or copies thereof) may be
found with the company, in the protocol of the notary who created it, or in the public
registry of commerce. Organization-related issues that could affect a private equity fund's
investment include:
(i) Corporate Form.
Mexican law permits the formation of different types of commercial entities; some
are better suited to private equity investments than others. 140 Where a fund will take an
equity interest, due diligence should confirm that the target company is organized either
as a S.A. (Sociedad Anonima) or S.A. de C.V. (Sociedad Anonima de Capital Variable).14 1
The reason for this is that other corporate forms-for example, the S.R.L. (Sociedad de
Responsibilidad Limitada) or the S.N.C. (Sociedad en Nombre Collectivo), inter alia-do
not issue stock. 142 Logically, when a fund thinks it may exit by IPO, utilization of a corpo-
rate form that contemplates the issuance of equity is essential.
134. See FIL, supra note 129, art. 28.
135. Id. art. 38.
136. Id. art. 32.
137. Id. art. 38.
138. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America, the Government of Canada, and the Government of the United Mexican States, Jan.
1, 1994, in DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, vol. 4, pts. 13, pts. 48 & annexes, ch. 11, art. 1109(1)
(Philip T. von Mehren ed., 1999) [hereinafter NAFTA].
139. Id. ch. 11, art. 1102(1).
140. "Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles" D.O., 4 de agosto de 1944, art. 1 [hereinafter LGSM].
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(ii) Corporate Purpose.
The organizational instrument must identify a company's purpose.1 43 In their due
diligence, fund managers should ensure that it is legal and consistent with fund invest-
ment objectives. Companies with illegal purposes are null and subject to immediate liqui-
dation. 144 Moreover, indications of multiple past purposes may provide insights into the
overall soundness of the corporation's business concept and/or management.
(iii) Compliance with Necessary Formalities.
Article 5 of the LGSM requires that companies be organized either before a notary or
in accordance with the procedures entailed in a public subscription.1 4 5 Non-compliance
with this requirement could result in the subsequent institution of summary proceedings,
contrary to the fund's interest. 146
b. Capital Structure.
A crucial dimension of the due diligence process is the target company's capital
structure. The organizational instrument should contain useful information regarding
the number, par value, and characteristics of the shares comprising capital stock. 14 7
Where a fund's investment requires the holding of stock with particular features (for
example, convertible preferred), the due diligence process should determine whether that
class is expressly provided for in the company's organizational instrument. 148 Where the
desired class is contemplated in the organizational instrument, the acts of the sharehold-
ers' meetings should be checked to determine whether said shares have been the subjects
of any corporate action.
If a fund does seek preferential shares, fund managers must also consider the
acceptability of the voting limitations set forth in article 182.149 Should they not be
141. While either a S.A. or a S.A. de CV. will technically satisfy the equity and exit interests of a
potential private equity investor, the S.A. de C.V. may prove more flexible in that its capital
stock can be increased with greater ease and less cost. See id. art. 213. It is, moreover, possible
to transform a S.A. into a S.A. de C.V. See id. art. 227.
142. S.R.L.s cannot, by statute, raise capital by public subscription. Id. art. 63. With the proper
foundation, however, it is possible to transform these types of corporations into S.A.s or S.A.
de C.V.s. See id. art. 227.
143. Id. art. 6.
144. Id. art. 3.
145. Id. arts. 5 & 90.
146. Id. art. 7.
147. Id. art 91.
148. Mexico's LGSM permits the creation of various classes of shares with special rights pertaining
to each. If so provided in the organizational instrument, one part of the shares may only be
given the right to vote in extraordinary assemblies. Shares with such limited voting rights do,
however, have preferential status with respect to the payment of dividends and liquidation. Id.
art. 113. Moreover, article 114 of the LGSM provides for the issuance of special shares to per-
sons who furnish services to the company. Id. art. 114.
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acceptable, the fund manager must determine the target company's willingness to
expand the fund's voting rights.
The due diligence process should also determine the distribution of shares within a
company's capital structure. This can be accomplished by examining the company's stock
ledger. 150 To the extent that most SMSEs in Mexico are controlled by a family or a small
group of families, this inspection should not be overly complicated, assuming records
have been maintained. Through this means, the fund can, in theory, gain a clear idea of
all parties with an interest in the target company.
c. Corporate Governance.
Due diligence programs must also consider the structure of corporate governance
established in the target company's organizational instrument. In undertaking this consid-
eration it is important that U.S. investors understand that contrary to the general U.S. prac-
tice of centralizing power in the board of directors, ultimate power in Mexican companies is
vested in the assembly of shareholders. The most basic determination a fund manager must
make in this connection is whether the rights and responsibilities set forth in a company's
organizational instrument depart from the standards published in the LGSM.
(i) Directors.
Information pertaining to a company's administration must be presented in its orga-
nizational instrument. 15 1 Representation of the company can be vested in a board of
directors appointed by shareholders or a sole administrator.1 52 Said appointments are
temporary and revocable.
Through due diligence, fund managers should determine whether directors have
been issued powers of attorney to sign for and otherwise act on behalf of the company
pursuant to articles 10 and 100 of the LGSM. Where applicable, fund managers should
review and understand the scope of the authority conferred. 153 Additional information
149. Id. art. 182. Article 113 shares are only permitted to vote on the following issues at extraordi-
nary meetings: (1) an extension of the duration of the company; (2) the planned dissolution of
the company; (3) a change of the company's purpose; (4) a change of the company's nationali-
ty; (5) transformation (the conversion of the company from one type to another); and (6) a
merger with another company.
150. Id. art. 128.
151. Id. art. 6.
152. Id. arts. 10 & 100.
153. Powers of attorney in Mexico constitute a contract by which the principal empowers an agent
to perform acts having legal effect (actos juridicos) on behalf of the principal. Their signifi-
cance should not be underestimated, as they are usually the first point of attack in any contro-
versy, and defects therein can be legally fatal. Mexican powers of attorney can be either general
(full) or special (limited). General powers include: (1) the general power of attorney; (2) the
general power of attorney for litigation and collections; (3) the general power of attorney for
acts of administration; and (4) the general power of attorney for acts of ownership. Special
powers of attorney include: (1) the special power of attorney to issue, endorse, and guarantee
negotiable instruments; (2) the special power of attorney to open, cancel, and sign checks
against bank accounts; (3) the special power of attorney for labor matters; (4) the special
power of attorney for customs matters; and (5) the special power of attorney to participate in
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about directors may be obtained through the use of questionnaires (looking into, for
example, stock owned, other financial interests, benefits, compensation, personal back-
ground, etc.).1 54
(ii) Managers.
Either the board of directors or the general assembly of shareholders may name gen-
eral or special managers. 155 Where this has occurred, fund managers should identify the
scope of managerial authority granted (for example, through powers of attorney), as well
as the manager's professional qualifications. Fund managers may request that managers
fill out a due diligence questionnaire similar to that discussed for directors, supra.
Managerial positions can be revoked at any time per article 145 of the LGSM.
(iii) Comisarios.
Fund managers must also investigate the target company's statutory examiner, or
comisario. Responsible for general financial oversight and auditing, comisarios must meet
specific standards of independence. 156 Should a fund be dissatisfied with the target com-
pany's comisario, it is possible to arrange for a replacement.1 57
(iv) Shareholders.
The last class of actor whose corporate governance role must be taken into account is
the general assembly of shareholders. Constituting the "supreme organ of the compa-
ny,"15 8 it may, depending on the terms of the grant of authority set forth in the company's
organizational instrument, agree to ratify all acts and operations. Given the potentially
huge degree of control that can be exercised by this group, fund managers must deter-
mine whether the procedures and subject matter pertaining to ordinary and extraordi-
nary assemblies are acceptable in light of fund investment criteria and objectives.15 9
d. Past Acts.
Documentation and records related to past corporate meetings must also form part
of a fund manager's due diligence investigation. While these records may not always be
kept in smaller, more informally managed commercial entities, they can, where available,
help fund managers obtain a clearer idea of the target company's developmental history.
Assuming availability, fund managers should specifically examine the minutes of past
government and private procurements and invitations to bid. See Javier F. Becerra & George
Humphrey, Powers of Attorney in Mexico: Guidelines and Strategies, in MEXICAN LAW: A TREATISE
FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS 69, 73-104 (Jorge A. Vargas ed., 1998).
Powers of attorney that have been properly issued can be examined in the company's folio mer-
cantil at the Registro Publico de Comercio.
154. See Mark Schonberger & Vasiliki B. Tsaganos, Top Twelve Frequently Asked Questions by Junior
Associates, in CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE, supra note 125, at 109.
155. See LGSM, supra note 140, art. 145.
156. Id. art. 165.
157. Id. art. 164.
158. Id. art. 178.
159. Id. art. 181.
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board meetings, as well as the resolutions of past ordinary assemblies. 160 If it is the case
that the company has had an extraordinary meeting, resolutions taken therein can be
found at the notary before which they were registered or the public registry of commerce
within which they were inscribed.
A final point that should be considered with respect to the investigation of past
meetings is that Mexican corporate law does permit the taking of board and shareholder
decisions outside of the procedural framework otherwise prescribed, provided, in both
cases, that the vote was unanimous and confirmed in writing.' 6 1 The records pertaining
to any such decision will need to be requested directly from the company.
3. Financial Condition.
The ultimate worth of a fund manager's due diligence will be determined by his or
her access to reliable and meaningful historical and pro forma financial information.
Minimally, fund managers should request and review all LGSM article 172 director
reports (i.e., progress and projects, accounting standards and informational policies,
financial condition, income-explained and categorized, changes in financial position,
changes in assets, and clarifying notes) and LGSM article 166 comisario audits and opin-
ions (audits of operations, documents, records; annual opinion of truthfulness, sufficien-
cy, and reasonableness of the board's information to shareholders; annual opinion on
adequacy of the company's informational policies and accounting standards; and annual
opinion that directors' information correctly and sufficiently reflects the financial condi-
tion and income of the company). 162
While not expressly mandated by Mexico's corporate legislation, the prudent fund
manager may additionally seek from the comisario and/or external accounting firm an
opinion letter regarding the company's current tax status. This opinion should indicate
whether the company has previously (1) made any tax ruling requests, (2) been the sub-
ject of either federal claims for past due employee related taxes or contributions such as
Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad Social (IMSS), INFONAVIT, or state payroll taxes, (3)
been delinquent on payment of real property taxes (obtain copies of the receipt for the
impuesto predial), or (4) been involved in tax litigation. 163
Concomitant with said examinations, fund managers should also inspect the compa-
ny's "books." Notwithstanding the existence of certain statutorily prescribed managerial
duties and accounting standards, caution should be exercised, as it is easy for companies
(particularly smaller, more informally run entities) to maintain parallel sets of books and
160. Id. art. 194.
161. Id. arts. 134 & 178.
162. In the event the fund is dealing with a S.A. de C.V., the manager should review increases and
reductions of capital stock recorded in the special register book mandated by article 219 of the
LGSM. Id. art. 219.
163. These inquiries are essential to the avoidance of future problems insofar as it was, until recent-
ly, easy for Mexican companies to regularly ignore their tax obligations with impunity. As rev-
enue policy changes and tax collection techniques sharpen, many companies have found them-
selves with large past due tax balances.
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records. 164 As a supplement to these examinations, fund managers should identify and
seek leave to review any and all bank, brokerage or investment accounts, trade receivables,
loan agreements, lines of credit, letters of credit, contingent liabilities-whether disclosed
or not, and royalty or technical assistance obligations.
a. Financial Areas of Special Consideration.
Two aspects of a fund manager's due diligence that merit special attention are
accounting and debt.
(i) Accounting Practices.
Article 158 of the LGSM imposes on directors a duty to create and manage systems
of accounting, control, and bookkeeping and filing. 165 Because such systems are more
often than not non-compliant with U.S. GAAP, fund managers must realize that impor-
tant measures of the company's financial performance or condition may be distorted. 166
While significant progress has been made over the last years to toughen accounting
standards in Mexico, the rules set by the Mexican Institute of CPA's (the CPC, or
Comisi6n de Principales de Contadores) are less onerous than those mandated by the FASB
in the United States. 167 Where no Mexican rule or standard exists CPC bulletins call for
the use of international accounting standards (IAS), effective January 1, 1995. As of this
writing, IASC records indicate that only two Mexican companies have fully implemented
IAS standards. 168 Should the accounting situation prove unacceptable, a fund manager
164. Adding impetus to this practice is the fact that commercial entities that employ large numbers
of people often maintain parallel corporate structures (one is used for storing profits while the
other employs workers). While this practice enables Mexican employers to circumvent the
mandatory profit sharing provisions set out in articles 113 and 114 of the Federal Labor Law, it
also can obscure a company's true financial condition. Additionally, in examining a company's
books, fund managers should be on the look out for signs of money laundering activity (for
example, the structuring of deposits involving cash, checks, money orders, and/or wire trans-
fers to fall below the U.S.$10,000 mark). Private equity investments-particularly those
involving the Internet or e-commerce-do provide attractive opportunities in this connection.
Mexico has recently enacted anti-money laundering transaction reporting requirements simi-
lar to those of the United States.
165. Detailed accounting records in Spanish using-Mexican pesos should exist for the general
ledger, the general journal, and the record of inventories and trial balances. These records
should be on file at the official domicile of the business for the preceding ten-year period. See
Ernst & Young, Doing Business in Mexico (visited Jan. 21, 2000) http://www.taxsites.com.
166. Examples of differences between Mexican and United States generally accepted accounting
principles include the statement of cash flow (Mexican inflation adjusting techniques may dif-
fer from U.S. GAAP), deferred income taxes (temporary differences flow from the way pur-
chases may be deducted for tax purposes under U.S. and Mexican GAAP), and employee profit
sharing (the effects of any deferral are not recorded under Mexican GAAP). [Prospectus of
Coca-Cola FEMSA, S.A. de C.V., Prospectus with Registration Nos. 333-5764 and 333-5868,
Oct. 30, 1996.1
167. A small number of Mexican companies do report in U.S. GAAP or in a format that is other-
wise U.S. GAAP reconciled. These exceptions tend to be large, publicly traded entities.
168. The two companies are CIFRA and MMT, better known as Mexican Maritime Transport.
IASC Report (visited Oct. 19, 1999) http://www.iasc.org.uk.
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may require U.S. GAAP reconciled financial statements with accompanying notes.
Although such action would be difficult and costly in the short term, it could ultimately
streamline the exit process.
(ii) Debt Position.
The other potentially troublesome area for many Mexican companies involves their
debt position. Having been exposed to almost constant financial crises since the early
1980s, many Mexican businesses carry significant, if not unmanageable, debt burdens.
This over-leveraging underlies the Mexican banking industry's massive portfolio of non-
performing loans, the socially divisive FOBAPROA bailout, and the populist "el Barzon"
movement. In a domestic context, private equity financiers would surely attempt to
obtain an indemnity agreement with respect to the outstanding obligations. In Mexico,
however, article 13 of the LGSM precludes this strategy by mandating that "a new partner
or shareholder of a company already organized shall be responsible for all company oblig-
ations contracted prior to his admission. Any agreement to the contrary will have no
effect to the prejudice of third parties."'169 Accordingly, it is important that funds obtain a
realistic assessment of a target company's debt position.
4. Legal Position.
With respect to the target company's overall legal position, fund managers should
review, as appropriate, the company's contracts with key employees, property records,
environmental permits, intellectual property registrations, import/export licenses, and
litigation history. Moreover, where the fund's exit strategy looks to a merger or sale, close
consideration must be given to Mexico's antitrust laws. The following subsections identify
the key issues associated with each legal consideration.
a. Key Employee Contracts.
The employment contracts of all key employees should be carefully reviewed by fund
managers, keeping in mind that (1) employee relations in Mexico are not at will and (2)
removing problematic personnel can be a delicate and expensive process. 170 Fund man-
agers should specifically understand what notions, if any, of "just cause" are laid out in
169. LGSM, supra note 140, art. 13.
170. This situation is not helped by the fact that Mexico will have jurisdiction over a Mexican labor
dispute. See Luis Ruiz Gutierrez & William E. Mooz, Jr., Labor Relations in Mexico, in AN
INTRODUCTION TO DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO 217 (William E. Mooz, Jr. ed., 1995). Moreover,
to the U.S. investor's detriment, there is no legal possibility for a diversity-based removal, like
in the United States. As Mexican legislation notes, the possibility of bias or prejudice on the
part of a magistrate or judge is neutralized by his or her duty to be impartial. U.S. private
equity investors should realize, however, that if the recipient company meets the standards of
commercial informality set out in article 352 of the Ley Federal de Trabajo (LFT) (i.e., the enti-
ty is a family business, operated primarily by family members with fewer than two employees),
the protections of the LFT will not be available to workers (excepting the provisions on health
and safety). "Ley Federal de Trabajo" D.O., 1 de abril de 1970, art. 352. [hereinafter LFT].
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employment contracts, as well as the extent of any severance benefits. 17 1 Early identifica-
tion of labor related obstacles could enhance the fund's comfort with the investment.
Alternatively, should an employee be particularly valuable, fund managers should
determine whether (1) there is key person insurance coverage on that person and (2) the
adequacy of that individual's current compensation package. The latter point can be
especially significant in the context of venture capital transactions insofar as the overall
success of the investment may depend on giving proper incentives to the founders to
build the company. To date, Mexican companies have not made wide use of U.S. style
compensation strategies such as stock option plans, largely because the majority of cor-
porations in Mexico have unlisted shares. Increased foreign investment, coupled with a
rise in listings, may facilitate the introduction of a broader range of compensation pack-
ages going forward.17
2
Last, fund managers should ascertain whether any key personnel are subject to immi-
gration restrictions. Where a key individual is foreign the due diligence process should deter-
mine whether there is any risk of adverse performance by the company as a result of the tem-
porary or permanent immigration-related absence of the non-Mexican individual.
Outside of the aforementioned labor issues, a fund manager should discover (1)
whether the company has been effected by strikes in the past, (2) the strength of labor unions
within the base of workers, and (3) the general nature of company-syndicate relations.
b. Property Records.
Where the target company owns fixed assets or equipment of value, fund managers
should review the validity of all associated documents, deeds, titles, etc. 173 In this way, the
fund will be able to avoid time consuming and costly future disputes regarding ownership
or rights. Items whose existence and validity should be confirmed are: recent surveys of
property conducted by a registered professional; a certified copy of the history of the
property (historial de la propiedad) issued by the public registry of property (akin to a
title search); acquisition deeds, if any; deeds of merger and/or sub-division (fusion or re-
lotificacion); the agrarian certification of the enterprise, if applicable (certificado de ina-
fectabilidad agraria); a certificate of no liens (certificado de libertad de gravamenes); docu-
171. See LFT, supra note 170, arts. 47 & 53. Where an employee challenges a dismissal, the employer
carries the burden of proof on the issue of just cause. Id. art. 48. Mexico's labor laws are very
protective of workers. Upon a termination imputable to the employer, the indemnity entailed
in the severance package consists, generally, of three months salary plus, in certain cases, an
amount representing the equivalent of twenty days pay for each year of service. Id.
Alternatively, the employer may choose to reinstate the employee. Id. See also Charles A.
Beckham, Jr., Texas/Mexico Cross-Border Insolvency and Collections, Paper presented at the
State Bar of Texas Seminar "Business and Litigation in Mexico" (Feb. 1999).
172. In an important break from traditional compensation practices, some private equity financiers
insist that local founders receive attractive option packages, largely to ensure their continued
maximum performance. As Susan Segal, the head of Chase Capital Partners, notes with regard
to that private equity group's practice of offering stock options worth approximately fifteen
percent of a deal, "Queremos que todos esten inotivados, desde la secretaria para arriba" ("We
want everybody to be motivated, from the secretary up"). Darrigrandi, supra note 33, at 23.
173. The validity of title should be given extra scrutiny where real property has been recently
acquired from what had been an ejido.
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mentation pertaining to any guarantees issued by the company affecting or encumbering
real property; a complete list of all machinery, equipment, or other heavy duty assets,
together with proof of purchase (or lease) and payment; complete files and titles for any
vehicles; and documentation pertaining to any liens or encumbrances on non-real prop-
erty. Fund managers should also ascertain whether the target company is current on its
utilities or miscellaneous obligations (water, gas, electric, phone, computer leases, etc.)
and not open to future claims of liability for past due balances.
c. Environmental Records.
As a result of the recent strengthening of Mexico's environmental laws, a fund man-
ager's due diligence must confirm a target company's environmental compliance. This
investigation, when applicable, is crucial as violations can result in substantial fines to the
detriment of the fund's investment. The need for a heightened level of attention in this
regard stems jointly from (1) the past tendency of Mexican companies not to comply
with environmental laws 174 and (2) the recently demonstrated interest on the part of the
state in enforcing its environmental regulations.
To protect the fund from unwanted and unnecessary liabilities, fund managers
should confirm the existence and validity of the following: all environmental applications
or registration documents (including the Comprehensive Environmental License applica-
tions, the Operating License application, any applications for the generation and/or han-
dling of hazardous wastes, waste water discharge registrations, and the SEMARNAP regis-
tration); any accompanying environmental surveys, reports, studies, or statements
(including the company's Environmental Impact Statement, and Preventative Report); all
licenses and rulings, specifically its Operating License (laconic de funcamiento); any
monthly or periodic reports otherwise required by SEMARNAP; blueprints, plans, and
specifications for hazardous waste storage facilities; contracts for the storing, collecting,
transporting, recycling, incineration, or final disposal of hazardous waste; cargo manifests
or bills received from a consignee of hazardous waste; the findings of any inspection visits
by either federal or state authorities; and any claims filed against the corporation by either
governmental agencies or private parties.
d. Intellectual Property.
Where applicable, the due diligence process should include a review of the target
company's intellectual property. This aspect of the due diligence is particularly meaning-
ful when a fund's investment is closely linked to technology-sensitive operations.
With respect to proprietary intellectual property, fund managers should review any
patents, trademarks, trade names, trade secrets, or copyrights owned by the company.
IMPI (Instituto Mexicano de Prodiedad Industrial) registrations should be confirmed (so
174. A vivid example of this tendency involves the disposal of hazardous waste. Of the eight million
tons of hazardous waste recently produced in Mexico, the location of only one ton is known;
the remaining seven tons of hazardous material were presumably disposed of illegally. See Sam
Quinones, Mexico's Wastelands, Bus. MEx., Apr. 1999, at 38.
136 NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas
as to be valid against third parties) and the duration of the intellectual property's benefi-
cial term noted. 175
If the investment contemplates the subsequent registration of intellectual property,
fund managers must consider the procedures and protections set forth in Mexico's
recently updated industrial property legislation. 176 Notwithstanding the many improve-
ments contained therein, the official publication of applications can be subject to sub-
stantial delays. 177 This fact may be significant in relation to investment opportunities that
are time sensitive. U.S. parties that make medium to long-term investments need not
worry that the beneficial changes brought about by national legislation will be repealed in
future years as NAFTA effectively freezes the terms of local law. 178
In the event the business of the target company depends on or utilizes licensed intel-
lectual property, the fund manager should (1) define the remaining term of the license
agreement and (2) confirm that it is properly recorded with IMPI. The adequacy and
terms of any related technical assistance, services, and know-how agreements should also
be reviewed.
Finally, fund managers should determine whether any infringement claims have
been raised either by or against the company. This step is particularly relevant in the
case of an investment that contemplates heavy Internet or e-commerce activity. To this
end, fund managers should ensure there is no conflict regarding desired domain names
and trademarks.
e. Customs Regime.
Where a target company's operations are tied to either importing or exporting, a
fund manager must review its customs and foreign commerce programs. Specifically, a
fund manager should confirm the existence and validity of the company's permanent and
temporary import declarations (pedimentos), documents from customs valuation pro-
ceedings, maquila or other export agreements, and eligibility for either federal or state
export incentives.
175. U.S. investors should realize, however, that registration alone is no guarantee that a company's
intellectual property will be immune from infringement. While Mexico was finally removed
from the USTR's list of the world's most egregious intellectual property violators, rampant piracy
and weak enforcement continue to characterize the system. As recently as 1998, Mexico was
given a warning by the USTR to beef up its intellectual property protections. According to the
USTR's report, piracy and counterfeiting remain major problems in Mexico with U.S. industry
losses increasing annually. Ana Machuca, Software Bandits, Bus. MEX., Oct. 1998, at 38.
176. "Ley de la Propiedad Industrial" D.O., 27 de junio de 1991 [hereinafter LPI].
177. Article 52 of the Industrial Property Law requires the publication of patent applications in the
Gazeta de Propiedad Industrial within eighteen months of filing. Id. art. 52. To the extent that
the Gazeta has a history of being behind schedule, the date on which coverage begins may be
delayed. Gretchen A. Pemberton & Mariano Soni, Jr., Mexico's 1991 Industrial Property Law, 25
CORNELL INT'L L.I. 103, 109 (1992).
178. See Lori M. Berg, The North American Free Trade Agreement and Protection of Intellectual
Property: A Converging View, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y 99, 102-122 (1995).
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f. Antitrust Review.
Where a fund anticipates exiting by sale to or merger with another corporation, the
due diligence process must consider Mexico's antitrust laws. Taking into account the
amount of the investment, the size of the private equity fund, and the size of the target
company, fund managers must determine whether the contemplated investment qualifies
for an antitrust exemption 179 or, alternatively, whether the transaction will be subject to
registration with and the approval of the Federal Competition Commission (Comisi6n
Federal de Competencia, or CFC). 180 "Investments by private equity funds, particularly
first time investors in Mexico:' usually do not raise competition concerns.
18 1
If it is determined that there is no exemption and CFC approval is necessary, the
resultant filing must be submitted prior to the execution of the transaction documents. In
this case, subsequent transaction documents will reflect the authorization of the competi-
tion commission as a condition to closing and include an unwind mechanism whereby an
investor can divest in the event that the CFC denies or adversely conditions approval.
182
The requirement of CFC approval may subject a fund to additional financial disclo-
sure. 183 Moreover, delays associated with the obtainment of CFC approval can materially
compromise previously established investment timetables and objectives. As one practi-
tioner notes, regulatory delays of several months can thwart the parties ability to (1) take
advantage of favorable market conditions or (2) accomplish certain time-sensitive objec-
tives (for example, pay a maturing debt or make an acquisition of assets). Given these
opportunity costs, it is essential that a private equity fund understand in advance whether
a deal will be subject to CFC approval.
g. Other Aspects of Due Diligence Review.
The final element of a fund manager's due diligence entails the identification of any
pending litigation and an examination of the target company's key commercial relation-
ships. With respect to pending litigation, the fund manager should learn of all past and/or
present lawsuits, arbitral proceedings, mediations, and conciliations.184 If a matter has
been litigated or otherwise submitted for resolution, the fund manager must determine
whether any appeal has been taken, keeping in mind that Mexico has several different
types of appeal. In all cases, the fund manager should endeavor to communicate with the
lawyer who handled the matter.
179. See "Ley Federal de Competencia Economica:' D.O., 24 de diciembre de 1992, arts. 4-6 [here-
inafter LFCE].
180. See id. art. 20.
181. Enriquez, supra note 74.
182. See id.
183. CFC-related disclosure will include: (1) answering a questionnaire; (2) a legal and business
description of the parties to the transaction, including the partners of the fund's limited part-
nership; (3) a description of the transaction at issue; (4) annual reports of the fund; (5) audit-
ed financial statements of the fund; (6) the fund's incorporation documents; and (7) any other
information the Commission deems necessary. See id. See also LFCE, supra note 179, arts. 21,
24, & 28.
184. Arbitration is the primary form of ADR in Mexico. Mediation has, however, been growing in
importance.
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As for key commercial relationships, fund managers may request that the target com-
pany supply a list of suppliers, distributors, commission agents, or otherwise material
contracts. In addition to gaining an understanding of the substantive terms of these rela-
tionships, the fund manager may, by visiting with the representatives of these entities,
obtain valuable disinterested insights into the operations and reputation of the target
company.
Through the due diligence process a private equity fund stands the best chance of
uncovering facts and issues that could ultimately prove detrimental to its investment.
When such issues are identified, the fund manager must either negotiate a resolution or
forgo the investment.
Problems revealed through due diligence may be addressed by an amendment to the
target company's organizational instrument. Generally, a target company's organizational
instrument can be freely amended through the services of a notary.185 However, parties to
the transaction must ensure that the resulting modification does not violate certain non-
derogable provisions of Mexican corporate law. In this connection, fund managers should
understand that the following attempted changes constitute automatic violations of
Mexican corporate law and are of no effect: (1) any modification of the company's bylaws
in violation of the LGSM; 186 (2) any attempt to excuse a new shareholder from responsi-
bility for a pre-existing debt or obligation of the corporation; 18 7 (3) any provision that
excludes a shareholder from participating in the gains of the company; 188 (4) any provi-
sion authorizing a distribution prior to the restoration or absorption of losses from prior
years;' 8 9 (5) any decision of the board or general assembly of shareholders contrary to
capital reserve requirements; 190 (6) any provision that seeks to deny the minimum right
of a twenty-five percent shareholder to appoint at least one director (ten percent share-
holder in publicly traded corporation); 19 1 (7) any provision that calls for the holding of
ordinary or extraordinary shareholders meetings in any place other than the company's
domicile, except in the case of impossibility or act of God; 192 and (8) any agreement
restricting the voting rights of shareholders. 193
Some of these issues can present significant problems for U.S. private equity
investors (consider, for example, the prohibition on provisions that restrict the voting
rights of shareholders). Fortunately, the effects of such prohibitions can be circumvented
through the innovative code interpretation and deal structuring efforts of local counsel.
Other due diligence problems can stem from either the non-existence or a lack of
target company information. Such problems can, under certain circumstances, be
resolved by the target company's submission of detailed warranties and representations.
While this strategy is not the best solution for a fund trying to fully assess whether to
make an investment, it may be adequate where the fund manager has developed a high
degree of trust in the target company and its management.
185. See LGSM, supra note 140, art. 5.
186. Id.
187. Id. art. 13.
188. Id. art. 17.
189. Id. art. 19.
190. Id. art. 21.
191. Id. art. 144.
192. Id. art. 179.
193. Id. art. 198.
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E. THE INVESTMENT AGREEMENT.
Having determined that it will invest in a target company, the parties to the transac-
tion next negotiate and execute a series of agreements regarding the valuation of the com-
pany, the acquisition of the fund's ownership stake, shareholder's participation and gover-
nance rights, and exit options and procedures. 194 Representing the heart of the transac-
tion, these agreements frequently integrate points previously established in the LOI or,
where applicable, term sheets. To the extent possible, the substantive terms of these dis-
crete agreements will be incorporated into the recipient company's organizational instru-
ment. Said changes will be effective as between the parties to the agreements immediately.
They will have no effect, however, with regard to third parties until the time that the
revised organizational instrument is inscribed in the public registry of commerce. 
195
1. Pricing the Transaction.
One of the most difficult tasks in any private equity transaction is reaching an agree-
ment between founders and investors as to the price of the deal. While a fund's actual
required rate of return will vary in accordance with the circumstances of the investment,
the valuation process is critical insofar as it often informs the size and nature of the fund's
ownership stake.
Regardless of the type of equity issued, a fund's investment share is commonly deter-
mined by "projecting the company's value on some future date and backing out the per-
centage of ownership that provides the partnership with its required rate of return."
1 96
Said values are "typically based on multiples of projected after-tax earnings, earnings
before interest and taxes, or cash flow." 197 Factors that can complicate the valuation of a
Mexican company include the tendency of family-owned companies to not have audited
financial statements readily available, lingering problems with respect to the reliability of
government generated economic reports and financial projections, and the divergent
objectives of the parties themselves. 198 On the latter point, the company may want to
project a high future value, thereby reducing the amount of stock it will have to relin-
quish, whereas the fund may seek a more conservative forecast as a means of maximizing
its ownership interest.
2. Acquiring an Ownership Stake.
Depending on the results of the valuation, a fund will take either a majority or a
minority position in the target company's common stock, convertible preferred stock,
convertible subordinated debentures, straight preferred stock, or straight subordinated
194. In a typical private equity transaction, these agreements will be memorialized in a shareholder
agreement and a stock purchase agreement. These documents are herein collectively referred
to as "transaction documents!'
195. Alexis Rovzar, El Convenio o Acuerdo entre Accionistas, paper presented at the conference on
Capital de Desarollo en Mexico (Nov. 10-11, 1999) Veracruz, Mexico.
196. Fenn et al., supra note 17.
197. Id.
198. Lerner & Pacanins, supra note 36.
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debentures.1 99 A majority investment in a Mexican entity may (but does not necessarily)
entail the right to control and direct the daily administration of the company. Funds that
invest in companies with unproven or failed management frequently seek majority inter-
ests. Minority investors, in contrast, do not usually participate in the company's daily
administration. They do, however, often negotiate board representation as well as certain
control, approval, and transfer rights.200 It is "typically the case" that funds take minority
positions in Mexican companies.
20 1
3. Changes to Ownership Stake.
A fund's ownership interest may be modified prior to its formal exit in certain situa-
tions. For example, the fund may incorporate equity "earn-out" provisions into key
employment contracts as an incentive to perform and/or manage responsibly. Under this
strategy, management is permitted to increase its ownership share at the expense of
investors if pre-determined performance objectives are met.202 Objectives can be stated
in terms of earnings, the market value of the firm, or a combination thereof. 203 The same
principal can be applied in a way that punishes poor managerial performance or excessive
risk taking. In this situation, the fund, pursuant to previously negotiated buy-back rights,
re-acquires stock owned by the outgoing manager, thereby assuring the integrity of ongo-
ing operations.
4. Corporate Governance Rights.
Funds that take majority stakes generally have absolute discretion with regard to cor-
porate governance, and therefore do not negotiate for special rights. Funds that take
minority stakes, on the other hand, have a natural interest in securing the strongest par-
ticipation and minority rights possible. Key corporate governance features for which
minority investors may negotiate are considered below.
a. Board Representation.
Private equity funds with minority stakes typically seek to strengthen their ability to
participate in and monitor company affairs through board representation. 20 4 While
Mexican corporate law statutorily guarantees minority shareholders representing at least
twenty-five percent of the capital stock (ten percent in the case of a company whose
shares are traded on the stock exchange) the right to name at least one director, there is
199. LEVIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 1-4. The investor may also negotiate the acquisition of options
and/or warrants. The fund's choice will in most cases be driven by the circumstances of the
transaction. As previously mentioned, this paper focuses on the acquisition of equity securities.
200. See Rovzar, supra note 195.
201. Enriquez, supra note 74. While minority investments may be primarily a function of the valu-
ation analysis, other factors that can account for minority positions include (1) a conscious
desire on the part of the fund to avoid the fiduciary responsibilities associated with control and
(2) an unwillingness on the part of the founding family to relinquish control, regardless of cir-
cumstances. See id.




no prohibition against a fund using its leverage to obtain more positions.20 5 This said,
however, board members in Mexican companies tend to be elected in proportion to their
level of participation. 206 Small investors typically gain a board seat with limited veto
rights, while large investors gain an increased number of seats and enhanced veto author-
ity. To guard against reductions of a fund's equity stake, founders may insist that a direc-
tor "step-down" mechanism be included in the shareholders agreement.
20 7
As a means of ensuring their meaningful board participation, funds may negotiate
to: (1) require that its directors are necessary for the purpose of constituting a quorum;
(2) limit the recipient company's ability to remove directors; (3) have the right to fill
vacancies on the board; (4) be represented on all committees; 20 8 (5) restrict changes to
the size of the board; (6) require the company to nominate its officers; and (7) obtain vot-
ing agreements from the other shareholders to ensure the election of its nominees. 209 As
was the case with the general appointment (and step-down) of directors, agreements to
this effect should be confirmed in the shareholders agreement and, to the extent possible,
incorporated into the entity's organizational instrument.
b. Control Rights.
Private equity investors may also seek to enhance their security by negotiating for a
variety of control rights. As previously noted, foreign investors may, depending on the
characteristics of the stock, be entitled to certain statutory rights of participation.
2 10
While the rights contained in said provisions may, in some cases, overlap with those
required by a private equity investor, they are, for most foreign investors, incomplete.
211
As a supplement to rights set out in the LGSM, private equity investors may seek to
obtain the following additional control rights.
205. LGSM, supra note 140, art. 144.
206. See Rovzar, supra note 195.
207. See Alison Ressler, Shareholder Agreements, in SUCCESSFUL PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING, 254
(Terrene M. O'Toole & Mitchell S. Presser eds., 1998).
208. Outside of the board of directors (consejo de administracion), Mexican companies typically
have the following committees: the ejecutivo (with daily decision-making authority), the audi-
toria (which maintains control of the financial aspects of the company), and the compensa-
ciones (responsible for setting compensation, bonuses, etc.).
209. See Ressler, supra note 207, at 254. In this last connection, it will be recalled that article 198 of
the LGSM prohibits the introduction of any rule restricting the voting rights of shareholders.
The solution to this problem rests in the use of a shareholder voting trust (fideicomiso de
accionistas), as shall be explored in greater detail, infra. LGSM, supra note 140, art. 198.
210. Notwithstanding article 112's pronouncement that shares be of equal value and confer equal
rights, the rights set forth in articles 112 and 113 are variable. LGSM, supra note 140, arts. 112
& 113.
211. In this connection, preferential shareholders are not accorded the right to participate in (1) the
appointment of directors, (2) certain remuneration issues, (3) decisions to increase or reduce
capital, (4) the redemption of shares, and (5) the modification of the organizational instru-
ment. See id. arts. 181 & 182.
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(i) The Realization of Major Decisions.
Through this means, private equity investors are able to restrict the ability of the
founders to enter into certain types of decisions or transactions. Examples of major deci-
sions or transactions investors seek to control include: (1) proposed mergers, consolida-
tions, re-organizations, or changes of control; (2) changes in business purpose; (3) invest-
ments or capital expenditures beyond a certain level; and (4) budgeting. These restric-
tions are expressly set forth in a list that is, in turn, incorporated into both the sharehold-
ers agreement and, where possible, the company's organizational instrument.
(ii) Access to Additional Financing.
To the extent that the success of the investment is tied to the financial condition of
the recipient company, U.S. private equity investors may want to regulate the subsequent
issuance of debt or equity securities as well as the company's ability to incur indebted-
ness. In this connection, a fund may regulate the timing of future financing rounds,
thereby giving the recipient company the greatest possible incentive to perform. Should a
fund adopt this strategy, the terms and timetables should be memorialized in the share-
holder's agreement and, where possible, the company's organizational instrument.
(iii) Access to Information.
Even though Mexico's LGSM gives shareholders certain information rights,212 a fund
may seek to re-enforce and/or expand these rights by including a clause in the sharehold-
ers agreement confirming its right to access premises, inspect books and records, and
receive in a timely manner all reports prepared by the board and comisario. Advances in
travel and communications technology have worked to the benefit of foreign investors
intent on tracking investments by making it easier to attend meetings and monitor cor-
porate practices. 213
(iv) Employee Relations.
Through due diligence, a fund should already be aware of all key employment rela-
tionships. Because positive performance depends on the superior quality of a company's
management, U.S. private equity investors may insist on being able to control the hiring,
firing, and retiring process. 2 14 In this way funds can strike an optimal balance between
personal chemistry, professional talent, and profitability.
(v) Modifications.
The last issue for which a fund may seek to acquire control rights involves the proce-
dure for modifying the recipient company's organizational instrument. Because the
investment interests of private equity investors can be influenced by changes in said
instrument, funds may insist on having the right to control future modifications.
212. Id. art. 113.
213. As in the United States, it can be easier to obtain information about publicly traded companies
(through securities authorities) than for privately held companies.
214. As one fund manager relates, "if the CEO knows you have the power to fire him or her,...
you'll get your calls returned and be able to direct strategy." A Private Affair, supra note 95.
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c. Enforcing the Terms of the Shareholders Agreement.
The substantive terms contained in the shareholders agreement should to the extent
possible be incorporated into the company's organizational instrument. For the majority
of control-related issues presented, there should be no problem obtaining enforcement
(in some cases the right might already even be available by operation of Mexico's corpo-
rate law). Where a provision encroaches on a shareholder's right to vote (i.e., participate
in the company), however, the enforcement of the control right can be a delicate matter.
In order to effectively exercise control rights, a fund may condition its investment on
a recipient company's grant of unconditional approval rights. To this end, fund investors
in Mexico obtain super-majority or veto protections in the form of a qualified voting
quorum, thereby requiring the affirmative vote of the investor with respect to the afore-
mentioned control issues. 215 Structuring deals in this way is desirable'in that the private
equity investor is able to secure the approval rights it deems crucial to the investment in a
way that does not violate the LGSM's prohibition on provisions restricting a shareholder's
right to vote.
To avoid claims that the founders' grant of approval rights to foreign investors
impermissibly interferes with a shareholder's right of participation the parties may con-
sider leaving super-majority clauses out of the organizational instrument. Should this
strategy be pursued, the non-inclusion of the term would not vitiate its effect, specifically
for the reason that Mexico's corporation law recognizes the validity of decisions taken
outside of formal meetings (i.e., board and shareholders) by unanimous vote and con-
tained in writing. 2 16
5. Transfer Restrictions.
As private equity investments can last anywhere from three to ten years, it is impor-
tant for parties to have some means of assuring the "stability" of the capital financing and
pool of participating investors during the investment. Where one investor is particularly
large-or where a fund has made a co-investment with another fund-sudden divest-
ment can have seriously destabilizing effects on the overall transaction. Financial certain-
ty can be effectively secured, however, by incorporating the following specific transfer
restrictions into the investment agreement.
a. Retention Agreement.
The prohibition of any transfers for a pre-determined period of time is called a
"lock-up." The mechanism used to accomplish this end is often referred to as a "retention
agreement.:'
215. See Enriquez, supra note 74. Said procedures are not expressly provided for in Mexico's LGSM.
In what constitutes a good example of the flexibility and ingenuity of Mexico's commercial
laws, however, these procedures are widely used and upheld in practice. See Michael W.
Gordon et al., Panel Discussion: A Hypothetical Problem on Securities Law, 3 U.S. MEX. L.J. 93,
98 (1995).
216. LGSM, supra note 140, arts. 143 & 178.
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b. Prior Consent.
Parties to a transaction may permit a contemplated transfer, but only with the prior
consent of the other shareholders. This strategy permits funds and founders to preserve
the final word on who becomes an investor.2 17
c. Objective Standard.
In a strategy similar to the preceding, a transfer may be permitted only if the pur-
chaser meets specified objective standards (for example, financial strength, standing in
the industry, etc.).
d. Right of First Refusal.
A transfer may be permitted subject to a right of "first refusal." That is, should an
unrelated third party seek to buy the shares of an existing party to the investment agree-
ment, the other fund partners and founders would have the right to purchase the shares
sought by the third party in accordance with the proposed price, terms, and conditions.
e. Right of First Offer.
Finally, a transfer may be permitted subject to a "right of first offer." Under this pro-
vision, any party to the investment agreement that should wish to sell its shares must
offer the same to the other fund investors and founders. Only upon the refusal of the lat-
ter will the selling party have leave to proceed.
6. Exit Mechanisms and Options.
It is difficult to know in advance which strategies will ultimately be available for a
fund's exit. Because IPOs tend to deliver the greatest return, funds generally hope for a
market exit. Should an IPO not be possible, however, a fund must look to alternative exit
strategies such as the sale of shares to founders or third parties. Given the potential incon-
gruity between a fund's need for investment liquidity and the unpredictable nature of the
exit process, funds usually incorporate into the shareholders agreement clauses to cover
every conceivable situation. The main features and legal considerations associated with
the three primary exit options-sale to third party, sale to shareholders, and IPO-are
presented below.
a. Sale to Third Party.
Depending on the degree of control exercised by a fund, it will obtain either "tag
along" or "drag along" rights with respect to a subsequent sale of company shares or
assets to a third party. Such provisions supplement the control rights discussed supra.
Designed to protect the interests of a minority investor, tag along rights provide that
if "one or more shareholders sell in excess of a specified number or percentage of their
shares to a third party,' shareholders with the tag along rights have the right to participate
in the sale on a proportionate basis.2 18 These rights are valuable in that they reinforce the
217. See id. art. 130. This provision states that a company's social contract can contain pacts requir-
ing the board of directors to authorize any transmission of shares.
218. Ressler, supra note 207, at 259.
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rights of minority shareholders to participate in the sale of a company and receive their
pro rata share of the proceeds.
Drag along rights, alternatively, are useful in situations where the majority share-
holder encounters elements of internal opposition to a proposed sale. Pursuant to these
rights, shareholders who desire to sell their shares to a third party can require the other
shareholders to sell their shares under identical conditions in the same transaction. The
exercise of this right usually occurs in conjunction with the sale of an investor's entire
equity interest.
b. Sale to Shareholders.
Other mechanisms by which private equity investors assure the liquidity of their
investment are "puts" and "calls." A put option entitles an investor to require the recipient
company to purchase the former's equity interest and thereby facilitate its exit. The price
of the shares is usually determined by reference to a pre-established formula designed to
provide the investor with the purchase prices plus a premium. A call, on the other hand,
permits the recipient company to take out an equity investor at an agreed price that
incorporates a guaranteed return. Puts and calls usually become operative within fixed
periods of time, for example after the expiration of a lock-up period or during the pen-
dency of an IPO. Put and call provisions are frequently the subject of intense
negotiation.2 19
c. Public Sale of Shares.
To exit via an IPO, private equity investors must negotiate for and incorporate into
the shareholder agreement "registration rights." "Demand" registration rights require that
upon receipt of notice from private equity investors, the recipient company will initiate
and use its best efforts to realize a registered public offering that includes the shares of the
former party. "Piggy back" rights, in contrast, give private equity investors the right to
register their securities if and when the recipient company registers its securities. This
clause works in tandem with the control rights discussed supra to assure private equity
investors (particularly minority shareholders) that their interests will not be disregarded
by the majority.
Initial public offerings can be made to either Mexico's stock market (the Bolsa
Mexciana de Valores, or BMV), a foreign market (for example to NASDAQ or the NYSE),
or on multiple international markets.
Recipient companies that intend to do an IPO on Mexico's BMV must have the
approval of the CNV (Comisi6n Nacional de Valores),22° register with the RNVI (Registro
Nacional de Valores e Intermediarios),221 and obtain a listing with the BMV. Registration
requires the payment of fees, disclosure, and, ultimately, subsequent reporting. Basic
219. See id. at 263.
220. "Ley del Mercado de Valores' D.O., Jan. 2, 1975, art. 2 [hereinafter LMV]. An exemption to
CNV approval appears to be available for trades in securities that also do not constitute a pub-
lic offer and have as their object (1) the subscription of stock, (2) the merger or reorganization
of corporations, and (3) the sale of substantial portions of the assets of a business. Id. art. 13.
221. Id. art. 14.
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aspects of disclosure include audited financial statements (Mexican GAAP) going back
three years from the time of the listing application, certain legal information, and demon-
strated positive earnings for the same time period.222 Upon successful subscription with
stock market authorities, the company's shares, depending on the size of the entity and its
issue, will be offered in either the "Section A" or "MMEX" (Mercado para la Mediana
Empresa Mexicana) market segments. 223 The BMV's Section A has forty actively traded
companies. In contrast, the twenty-two entities on the intermediate exchange tend to be
more illiquid. 224
Notwithstanding the creation of this special "microcap" market and the BMV's con-
tinually increasing levels of capitalization, 225 there have not been a significant amount of
exits by IPO. 226 This situation is expected to change as Mexico's AFORES are permitted to
222. See Eduardo Trigueros, Opciones de Salida, Paper presented at the conference on Capital de
Desarollo en Mexico (Nov. 10-11, 1999) Veracruz, Mexico. The issuing company should ensure
that (1) the registration is in fact properly accomplished and (2) the information provided is
accurate and truthful. The consequences for failure in this regard include: the cancellation or
suspension of the registration, an administrative fine (for furnishing false or misleading infor-
mation in relation to the economic condition of the company or the securities issued, per arti-
cle 51, 11 of the LMV), or a prison sentence (for knowingly disseminating false information to
obtain a gain or avoid a loss, per article 52 Bis 2, I of the LMV). Violations of the latter type
may be prosecuted at the request of the Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico based on the
prior opinion of the CNV, per article 52 Bis 3 of the LMV. LMV, supra note 134, arts. 51 & 52.
223. Companies that make Section A offerings must have (1) net worth in excess of 125 million
UDIs (capital contable), (2) stockholders' equity in excess of 125 million UDIs, (3) average
earnings of at least 62.5 UDIs for the three previous years, (4) offered securities equal to at
least fifteen percent of the company's paid in capital, and (5) a minimum of two hundred
stockholders after the issue. Companies making MMEX offerings must have (1) net worth in
excess of 20 million UDIs (capital contable), (2) stockholders' equity in excess of 20 million
UDIs, (3) positive average earnings for the three years prior to the application, (4) offered
securities equal to at least thirty percent of the company's paid in capital, and (5) a minimum
of one hundred shareholders after issue. See INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION, RELEASE
No. 98-2, at 4 (Robert C. Rosen ed., Oceana Publications, 1994). A "UDI" is a unit of account
used to adjust financial and commercial operations for inflation. In April 1995, one UDI
equaled one peso. As of August 26, 1999, a UDI equaled 2.59 pesos. The UDI rate is adjusted
daily. See SHCP Report, supra note 2. According to one authority, the CNV's review process
lasts approximately two months. See INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES
REGULATION, RELEASE No. 132, VOL. 10C, at 4A-39 (Harold S. Blumenthal & Samuel Wolff eds.,
Dec. 1999). Shares that are publicly offered are not permitted to be in bearer form. See id. at
4A-41.
224. The Mexican Stock Market (visited July 4, 1999) http://www.mexonline.com/stocks.htm.
225. The capitalization of Mexico's stock market has increased from 1.37 percent of GDP in 1984 to
25.9 percent of GDP in the first half of 1999. SHCP Report, supra note 2. Analysts believe the
market has plenty of room to grow in the coming years. See Baron F. Levin, Flash in the Pan?,
Bus. MEX., Aug. 1, 1997, at 26.
226. If the trend established in Argentina and other Latin countries with respect to the making of
IPOs by infantile high-tech Internet start-up companies continues, Mexico, which is expected
to account for approximately twenty percent of the Latin American e-commerce market by
2005, may see an increase in the number of IPOs. See John Dorschner, Internet Gold is Still
Years Away, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 16, 2000, at C1.
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invest in a broader range of instruments 227 and insurance companies find themselves
with increased levels of investable income.228 In this regard, one industry observer com-
ments: "I think in the next few years we will start seeing life and property and casualty
companies growing into a more active lending or investing role."229 This expectation is
additionally supported by the BMV's recent expression of willingness to relax traditional
registration requirements (including the provision mandating the submission of three
years of financial data) under certain conditions with an eye to listing an increased num-
ber of start-up (particularly internet-related) companies. 230
By making the prospect of raising money on local markets more viable than before
these developments are likely to incite an increase in the number of private equity-related
listings and offerings going forward. Early examples of this include: Latin Americano
Duty Free, S.A. de C.V., Arabella, Milano, Agriexp, and Tekchem.
23 1
Whereas Mexican companies normally issue shares into the United States or other
foreign markets (for example, London, Tokyo) only after having first previewed the shares
on the BMV (thereby establishing a trading range), it is possible for a Mexican company
to make a transnational offering simultaneously in Mexico and abroad. 232 With respect to
issues in the United States, Mexican companies can pursue either a public offering or a
private placement. As there are normally greater initial disclosure and subsequent report-
ing requirements associated with a public offering, 233 many Mexican companies opt for a
private placement under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act.234
227. Recent reform of the Mexican Social Security System (Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad Social,
or IMSS) will contribute to the generation of domestic long-term resources to finance invest-
ment and the deepening of Mexico's capital market. See SHCP Report, supra note 2.
228. As a result of recent deregulation, foreign insurance companies can now invest in Mexico and
certain types of coverage have become mandatory for citizens (for example, automobile insur-
ance). Working hand in hand with these developments are (1) the decreased role of the state
in providing health care and (2) the de-regulation of Mexico's health care industry. The net
effect of these changes is that insurance companies will have more money available for invest-
ment. See Oliver Libaw, Long-Term Benefits, Bus. MEX., Aug. 1, 1997, at 28.
229. Rogers et al., supra note 86, at 70.
230. See Eduardo Garcia, Mexico May Ease Rules for Stock Listings, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 26, 2000, at
C2. Requests for exemptions from traditional registration requirements will be reviewed on a
case-by-case basis by a committee composed of independent local business people.
231. See Trigueros, supra note 222.
232. See LMV, supra note 220, art. 11. Securities issued by Mexican "moral persons" (companies)
offered for subscription or sale in foreign countries must be registered in the "seccion especial"
(special section) of the RNVI.
233. First time issuers in the United States are required to file, inter alia, an F-I in accordance with
either U.S. GAAP or home country rules accompanied by a U.S. GAAP reconciliation. See Luis
F. Moreno Trevino, Access to U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Issuers: Rule 144A Private
Placements, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 159, at 163. The trade-off entailed in a public offering for the
comparatively higher degree of disclosure and reporting in increased liquidity and prestige.
234. Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts from registration transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1988).
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The most common means of accomplishing an exempt private placement of foreign
securities pursuant to section 4(2) is via Regulation D.235 In this type of transaction,
shares are restricted in that they can only be sold to accredited investors (non-dealers)
without having been the object of a general solicitation. 23 6 While some disclosure is
required of the issuer, public policy considerations make it considerably less onerous than
that entailed in a public offering. 237 Regulation D offerings are usually accomplished
through the use of an offering memorandum.
Public offerings and private placements of Mexican Securities to U.S. investors have
increased significantly in recent years. Facilitating this trend, in part, has been the explo-
sive use of ADRs238 and, with respect to private placements, the promulgation of clearer
rules regarding the subsequent re-sale or secondary trading of restricted securities. 239
Moreover, the execution of a "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Comisi6n Nacional de Valores of Mexico" 240 on con-
sultations, technical assistance, and mutual assistance for the exchange of information has
served to bolster the confidence of U.S. investors instinctively attracted to the promising
returns associated with Mexican stocks but wary of local business practices. As long as
businesses in Mexico remain undervalued and American investors maintain their empha-
sis on portfolio diversification, more cross-border securities transactions can be expected.
235. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.506 (1993). Although Regulation D does not constitute the exclusive
means of making a private placement of foreign securities, it is heavily relied upon. Private
placements can also be accomplished through Regulation S. 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-.904 (1993).
236. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1993).
237. Because the scope of disclosure depends on the value of the offering, an issuer may or may not
be required to file an F-20. Where a company is required to file an F-20, the exercise should
not, in theory, be too difficult given the fact that Mexican corporate law mandates annual
financial reporting. The exception to this, of course, will be contending with divergent
accounting standards and practices. Id. § 230.502(b).
238. ADRs are negotiable receipts representing the securities of a foreign company that may be kept
in the vault of a U.S. bank. Through this arrangement, U.S. investors may trade the foreign
securities in the United States and receive dividends. See The Mexican Stock Market, supra note
224. As noted by one financial reporting service, "As little as 10 years ago, there were only a
handfil of ADRs from Latin America. Now the list is bulging with companies eager to tap into
the growing U.S. interest in investing in Latin America." Michael Molinski, Latin Investors
Should Mix Mutual Funds and ADRs, Jan. 3, 1997, (visited Sept. 9, 1999) http://www.latino-
link.com/BIZ/0 10397BB.HTM.
239. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a) (1993).
240. Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. SEC and the Comisi6n Nacional de Valores
of Mx. on Consultation, Technical Assistance, and Mutual Assistance for the Exchange of
Information, Securities and Exchange Commission, Int'l Ser., Release No. 181, [1990 SEC
LEXIS 3953] at 1 (Oct. 22, 1990) [hereinafter MOU]. In this MOU, the United States and
Mexico pledge to work together and/or use best efforts to (1) preserve the stability, efficiency
and integrity of the markets, (2) promote the development of Mexico's securities market, (3)
exchange information in conjunction with the investigation of the market and the enforce-
ment of securities laws, and (4) facilitate the conduct of investigations, litigation, or prosecu-
tions in cases where information located within the jurisdiction of the requested authority is
needed to determine or prove that the laws of the requesting authority have been violated. Id.
at 8.
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7. Enforcing Transfer Rights.
Private equity investment that constitutes a majority in a company should encounter no
difficulty in enforcing the aforementioned transfer rights. The same cannot be said, however,
with respect to investors with a minority stake. As presently written, Mexico's corporate laws
do not provide minority investors with any statutory means of forcing the recipient compa-
ny to uphold previously negotiated transfer rights. Rather, Mexico's corporate laws protect
local shareholders against any corporate acts that restrict their right to vote.
Several different self-executing mechanisms have been developed to guarantee the
compliance of the recipient company's shareholders with the transfer rights set forth in
the shareholders agreement. For example, U.S. investors may negotiate for and obtain an
irrevocable power of attorney establishing their authority to exercise transfer rights.
24 1
Alternatively, a fund may require that U.S. law govern the shareholders' agreement.
242
The most reliable mechanism, however, for assuring compliance with the transfer rights
contained in the shareholder agreement involves the establishment of a shareholder vot-
ing trust (fideicomiso de accionistas).24 3
"Under such an instrument, controlling shareholders deposit their shares and specifi-
cally pre-instruct the trustee to vote them in accordance with the instructions delivered
by the investor in certain circumstances" including, for example, the implementation of
registration rights, the sale of certain assets, or compliance with drag along or tag along
provisions.244 Through this mechanism, a fund will be able to insulate itself from claims
that it has violated the rights of local shareholders to vote and ensure the availability of an
exit option.
8. Other Considerations Bearing on Private Equity Transactions.
Aside from issues of stock purchase terms, corporate governance, and transfer rights
the investment agreement should also clearly address issues pertaining to representations
and warranties, the duration of the agreement, distributions, liquidation procedures and
rights, and the resolution of disputes. The key points associated with each issue are pre-
sented below.
a. Representations and Warranties.
Independent of any representation and/or warranty obtained in lieu of reviewable
documentation during the due diligence, investors typically seek extensive, detailed, and
specific representations and warranties concerning the business assets, liabilities, and
financial condition of the recipient company, its compliance with any applicable law
241. See Enriquez, supra note 74.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. Id. The strategic advantages of this mechanism are echoed by the remarks of another Mexican
practitioner: "I want to caution U.S. attorneys about article 198, which provides that any agree-
ment which restricts the freedom to vote of the stockholders is null and void. Because this lan-
guage has not been interpreted definitively, if one really wants to control the vote, a voting
trust must be established." John M. Stephenson, Jr. et al., Panel Discussion, Securities Law
Questions and Comments on the Comparison of Corporate and Securities Laws in Mexico and the
United States, 3 U.S. MEX. L.J. 29 (1995).
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and/or regulations, and its possession of all permits, authorizations, and/or licenses.
Investors may also request of the founders covenants and indemnifications in favor of the
investors for damages arising out of any breach by the founders. Said representations,
warranties, and covenants are set forth in the stock purchase agreement, and should be
structured so as to be effective for the duration of the investment. 245
b. Duration.
In the interest of certainty, parties to the transaction should expressly define the
duration of the agreement. Typically, investors will demand that the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties terminate on the consummation of (1) an underwritten public offer-
ing or the realization of a private placement; (2) a sale of all, or substantially all, of the
company's assets or capital stock; (3) a merger, consolidation, reorganization or other
business combination of the company resulting in the transfer of a pre-determined per-
centage of voting securities; or (4) at some specified future time. This term is usually set
forth in the shareholders agreement. 24
6
c. Distributions to Shareholders.
An issue of critical importance that must be addressed in the shareholders agreement
involves investors' dividend entitlement. The amount of a dividend is usually in propor-
tion to the shareholder's contribution, unless otherwise agreed. 247 Notwithstanding their
ability to negotiate for a larger share, investors should realize that provisions that exclude
a shareholder from participating in gains are of no legal effect. 248
The taking and holding of preferential shares provides the clearest statutory protec-
tion of a U.S. private equity investor's distribution rights and interests.249 According to
article 113 of the LGSM, the holders of preferential shares have a superior, and cumula-
tive dividend entitlement relative to the holders of ordinary shares. As described by one
practitioner, "the preferred shareholder usually receives a fixed preferred dividend and
shares pro rata with the common stock in the distribution of earnings."25 0-Should the
attributes associated with this type of stock be inadequate, the parties may choose to
effectively create special shares with mutually determined conditions and features in
accordance with the more flexible terms of article 114 of the LGSM. 25 1
245. See AROCENA, supra note 30, at 21.
246. See Joseph W. Bartlett, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS, RESTRUCTURINGS, AND
REORGANIZATIONS, at 212, 2d ed., vol. 3 (1995).
247. See LGSM, supra note 140, art. 16. Similarly, article 113 provides that the organizational
instrument may provide dividends for shares with limited voting rights superior to dividends
for ordinary shareholders. Id. art. 113.
248. Id. art. 17.
249. Recall, however, that preferred shares, as presented in the LGSM, may have limited voting
rights. As article 113 notes: "the organizational instrument may (emphasis added) provide that
one part of the shares shall have the right to vote in extraordinary assemblies" (as opposed to
an unqualified right to vote). Nothing prevents U.S. private equity investors from negotiating
more expansive rights. Id. art. 113.
250. Stephenson, Jr. et al., supra note 244.
251. LGSM, supra note 140, art. 114. These special shares are issued when (1) a person furnishes
services to the company and (2) the organizational instrument so provides.
Spring 2000 151
U.S. investors must further understand the absolute limitations imposed by Mexico's
corporate law with respect to distributions. First, where the recipient company has expe-
rienced a loss of capital, no distribution can be made until the loss has been restored or
the company's capital has been reduced. 252 Secondly, article 19 of the LGSM states that
distributions can only be made where (1) the financial statements have been duly
approved at the assembly of shareholders, and (2) losses suffered in previous fiscal years
have been restored, absorbed or otherwise offset by a reduction of capital. 253 Any action
to the contrary shall have no legal effect, and either the company or its creditors can
demand recovery or reimbursement for the wrongful distribution. 254 Moreover, in the
case of a young company, at least five percent of net profits must be withheld each year
for the purpose of establishing a reserve fund. This mandatory withholding must contin-
ue until the amount of the fund is one-fifth of total capital.255 Such a restriction could
present an obstacle to the exit of a zero or early stage investment.
Finally, U.S. investors must consider the tax consequences of private equity transac-
tions. While a full treatment of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, distributions
paid by a Mexican company to U.S. investors fall within the ambit of the U.S.-Mexico
Double Taxation Treaty.256 U.S. investors should consult with local tax counsel to deter-
mine whether the fund (or a co-investor such as a pension or retirement fund) is eligible
under Mexican law for a reduced tax rate or exemption. 257
d. Liquidation and Bankruptcy.
The investment agreement should anticipate and expressly establish the rights and
procedures that will be utilized in the event of dissolution or bankruptcy.
Notwithstanding the approval rights a fund may have negotiated with respect to the
winding down of a business, Mexican corporate law provides that an entity may be dis-
solved in the following circumstances: (1) expiration of the term established in the orga-
nizational instrument; (2) impossibility or consummation of the principal purpose; (3)
agreement of the shareholders, in accordance with the terms of the organizational instru-
ment; (4) the reduction of the number of shareholders to an impermissible level; and (5)
loss of two-thirds of capital stock.258 Pursuant to the procedures set forth in the LGSM,
shareholders should present any claim to the liquidator259 within the fifteen-day period
following the publication of the balance sheet of liquidation in the Official Daily
Gazette. 260 Upon the subsequent approval of this balance sheet, the liquidator will pay
252. Id. art. 18.
253. Id. art. 19.
254. Id.
255. Id. art. 20.
256. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Income Taxes, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mexico, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-7 (1992).
257. See Enriquez, supra note 74.
258. See LGSM, supra note 140, art. 229.
259. The liquidator is the legal representative of the company. Said representative is liable for acts
executed beyond the limit of their authority. This includes the responsibility to maintain the
books and records of the company for ten years following the conclusion of the liquidation.
Id. art. 235.
260. Id. art. 247.
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each shareholder his or her corresponding due against cancellation of that individual's
share certificates. 26 1 No shareholder may be paid, however, prior to the extermination of
all company liabilities. 262
It is similarly important that parties clarify the rules that are to govern in the event of
bankruptcy. In order to secure the most reliable protection 263 U.S. investors could, theo-
retically, require that any bankruptcy action be brought in a U.S. bankruptcy court,2
64
regardless of the fact that the relevant entity's principal place of business and place of
incorporation are in Mexico. Unless it is proven, however, that the U.S. court observed the
requirements contained in the Ley de Quiebras y Suspension de Pagos (LQSP), 265 a foreign
judgment declaring bankruptcy will not be executed. Consistent with the insistence on
the application of Mexican bankruptcy laws, the effects of any foreign judgment recog-
nized.will be governed by Mexican law.266
The alternative is to rely on the Mexican rules of bankruptcy267 as administered by
either a Mexican federal district court with full civil and criminal jurisdiction or the state
courts of general jurisdiction. 268 Where parties so provide, U.S. investors should realize
261. Id. art. 248.
262. Id. art. 243. Partial distribution may be authorized, however, under certain circumstances. Id.
263. A fund may seek out the protection of U.S. bankruptcy courts so as to avoid the type of extra-
judicial solutions that Mexican entities commonly resort to as a consequence of deficiencies in
Mexico's bankruptcy laws. One particular deficiency is the slow speed at which proceedings
are resolved. As one Mexican practitioner notes, "liquidation cases can take up to 15 years or
more to conclude." Victor Vilaplana, Bankruptcy, in MEXICAN LAW: A TREATISE FOR LEGAL
PRACTITIONERS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 153, at 521. Independent of the fore-
going facts, business people in Mexico tend to avoid bankruptcy because of the potential crim-
inal liability.
264. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2000). Almost any company with operations or property on both sides of
the U.S.-Mexico border is eligible to file bankruptcy, even if the debtor is a foreign corporation.
See In re Lopez, (5th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-50744) (mem. opinion June 3, 1997).
265. "Ley de Quiebras y Suspension de Pagos' D.O., Apr. 20, 1943 [hereinafter LQSP].
266. LQSP, art. 14. This said, however, it is important to note that some foreign trustees (sindicos)
have been successful in gaining recognition and enforcement of their bankruptcy claims in
Mexico. See Pesa Electronica, S.A., (7th Civ. Ct. of the City of Puebla) (File No. 37/96); Morgan
Trust Company of Canada v. Falloncrest Financial Corp. et al. (1st Court of First Instance of
City of Acapulco, Tabares Judicial District, State of Guerrero) (File No. 90-3/91) cited in THE
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF MEXICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW
112 (The American Law Institute ed., 1998). When considering whether to pursue a claim in
Mexico, creditors should keep in mind the fact that the assets sought may be long gone by the
time it takes to comply with all the substantive and procedural requirements.
267. These rules are currently undergoing reform. Designed to give banks broader power to recover
collateral (in the hope that this will help reactivate credit flows), the new law was approved by
the Mexican Senate on December 8, 1999, and subsequently sent to the House of Deputies. As
the law exists in this preliminary stage, it does not apply to debts less than four hundred thou-
sand UDIs. This qualification is a political and economic concession to "el Barzon," the grass
roots debtor movement. See Bankruptcy Laws Passed in Senate Despite PAN Opposition, CORP.
MEX., Dec. 8, 1999.
268. See "Constitucion Politica de los Estados Mexicanos," D.O., Feb. 5, 1917, art. 104 [hereinafter
MEX. CONST.]. As Mexico City has been the seat of a specialized bankruptcy court since 1988,
corporations that intend to start a bankruptcy case may change their domicile to the capital so
as to be able to avail themselves of that court's expertise. See Vilaplana, supra note 263, at 519.
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that one of a Mexican trustee's first acts upon commencement of a bankruptcy proceed-
ing269 will be the removal of extant directors and management. 270 To the extent that
bankruptcy proceedings can be initiated in a way that is completely beyond the control of
a private equity investor, Mexican bankruptcy law can pose a real threat to the ongoing
security of a fund's investment. 27 1
Following the creation of a plan of liquidation and the proper giving of notice to
creditors, the trustee pays the company's liabilities. U.S. investors are accorded non-dis-
criminatory treatment, meaning their interests will be satisfied in accordance with their
position in Mexico's hierarchy of priority. As creditors with "special privileges' U.S. pre-
ferred shareholders will be paid in advance of common shareholders.272 However, before
a U.S. preferred shareholder receives its share, Mexican bankruptcy law mandates the pay-
ment of: (1) singularly privileged creditors (this is a super-priority extended to the
employees of the debtor with wage claims that existed prior to the declaration of bank-
ruptcy); (2) secured creditors; and (3) tax claims held by the Secretaria de Hacienda y
Credito Publico.273
Provided assets remain at the U.S. investor's priority level, the LQSP provides that the
payment of the liability can be made in full or on a discounted basis. Although Mexican
law technically requires that debts be extinguished in Mexican pesos, debts associated
with bankruptcy can be documented in foreign currency.274 Where this is the case, the
applicable rate of exchange is that in effect at the time the case began. U.S. private equity
investors should exercise caution in this regard, as drawn out bankruptcy proceedings can
produce an undesired currency exchange loss.
A final point that must be considered involves the potential for board member crimi-
nal liability. According to articles 95 and 99 of the LQSP, members of the board of direc-
tors can be prosecuted and put in jail if their imprudent or fraudulent actions cause the
bankruptcy of a company.275 Funds that regularly place partners on the boards of the
recipient companies in which they invest should be cognizant of this potential liability
exposure. 276
e. The Resolution of Disputes.
U.S. private equity investors should incorporate into transaction documents features
that reduce the likelihood of disputes. For example, a fund may limit its investment activ-
ity to a recipient with which it has an established relationship premised on mutual trust
269. Bankruptcy proceedings can be begun either voluntarily (i.e., by the company) or involuntarily
(i.e., pursuant to an action by a creditor or the attorney general of Mexico). See id. at 521.
270. See LQSP, supra note 265, arts. 46-57.
271. U.S. investors that have successfully negotiated approved rights should have a greater degree of
control with regard to voluntary declarations of bankruptcy.
272. See LGSM, supra note 140, art. 113.
273. See Vilaplana, supra note 263, at 527. The claims of common shareholders are satisfied at the
next level down (common creditors from mercantile transactions). At the bottom of the list
are common creditors under civil law. See id.
274. See id. at 525.
275. LQSP, supra note 265, arts. 95 & 99. These articles, respectively, establish the elements and con-
sequences of culpable and fraudulent liquidations.
276. The practical reality, however, is that board members are rarely prosecuted under these provisions.
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and confidence. Similarly, the clear and proper structuring of approval, control, and
transfer rights will reduce the likelihood of inter-party disputes. Last, U.S. investors can
insist on the inclusion of a clause fixing liquidated damages in the event of any breach of
the agreement. 2 7
7
Should these built-in dispute avoidance strategies fail the investment agreement must
clearly indicate the manner in which conflicts will be settled. U.S. private equity investors
are best served by the establishment of a two-tiered dispute resolution mechanism (at a
minimum) involving arbitration followed by litigation.
(i) Arbitration.
Independent of the fact that article 2022 (1) of NAFTA encourages the use of arbitration
for the settlement of commercial disputes between private parties, 278 U.S. investors may wish
to use arbitration to avoid having to submit a matter to a slow and potentially corrupt local
court presided over by a judge inexperienced in matters of sophisticated finance. 279
If parties wish to arbitrate subsequent disputes, they should express this intent in the
transaction documents. Parties are free to choose either an institutional (for example,
under the rules of the AAA, ICC, IACAC, or UNCITRAL) or an ad hoc arbitration (i.e.,
the parties supply their own rules and procedure). If no procedural rules are selected,
then those contained within Mexico's Commercial Code will apply.280
Important related considerations involve the choice of forum and substantive law.
Mexican law permits parties to choose a foreign forum. 281 While convenience will be a
factor in this determination, U.S. investors should remember that to the extent arbitral
awards are enforced in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took
place, not all fora are equal. In this connection it is important to note that it is common
for U.S.-Mexico investment agreements to include a New York forum selection clause.
Regarding choice of substantive law, Mexican courts will generally respect the legal and
equitable selection of the parties,282 provided it does not violate any rule requiring an
issue to be determined under Mexican law.283 Absent a choice by the parties, an arbitral
panel is free to determine the applicable law.284
277. Mexico's public policy involving liquidated damages is not as restrictive as that of the United
States. See " Codigo de Comercio," D.O., Oct. 17, 1889, arts. 1840-1844 [hereinafter
COD.COM.].
278. NAFTA, supra note 138, art. 2022 (1).
279. In this connection, one commentator has described Latin judicial processes as expensive, time-
consuming, and inefficient. See David Swafford, Storming the Castle, LATIN FIN., at 20.
Notwithstanding the general slowness of Mexican courts, it is possible for a case to proceed on
an expedited basis. An example of this involves suits based on negotiable instruments (such as
checks, mortgages, and guarantees). See COD.COM., supra note 277, arts. 1391-1414. Amparo
actions, moreover, are designed to provide an expedited measure of relief. See Kenneth L.
Karsa & Keith S. Rosenn, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, tentative 2d ed., at 188
(2000).
280. COD.COM., supra note 277, arts. 1435, 1439, & 1440.
281. CoD.CoM. art. 1436.
282. COD.COM. art. 1445.
283. See "Codigo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles;' D.O., Feb. 24, 1942, as amended by D.O., Jan. 7,
1988, art. 568 [hereinafter CFPC].
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Arbitration is a meaningful process only insofar as arbitral awards are ultimately
enforceable. As between U.S. and Mexican parties, enforcement of arbitral awards is gen-
erally governed by the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention).2 85 Challenges to the enforcement
of an award can be raised under the New York Convention, although these have been nar-
rowly construed. It is also possible for the enforcement of an arbitral award to be chal-
lenged under Mexican law on grounds akin to those permissible under the New York
Convention. 286
Assuming a challenging party's inability to establish a defense, both the New York
Convention and Mexico's Codigo de Comercio mandate the enforcement of awards. 287
The courts of both the United States and Mexico have demonstrated a consistent willing-
ness to enforce valid arbitral awards. 288 This trend has led some Mexican lawyers to
observe that U.S. parties may have a better chance of entering an arbitral award in Mexico
than a foreign judgment, thereby giving an additional impetus for parties to choose arbi-
tration over litigation.289
b. Litigation in the United States.
Should arbitration fail, parties will be left with no alternative but to litigate their dis-
putes. To the extent Mexican law upholds parties' freedom to choose the forum and gov-
284. See CoD.COM., supra note 277, art. 1445.
285. Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 9
U.S.C. § 201, 330 U.N. Treaty Ser. 38, No. 4739 (1959) [hereinafter New York Convention].
The United States and Mexico are party to another treaty on the subject, the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975 (also known as the "Panama
Convention"). Where both conventions are applicable, the conflict is determined in accor-
dance with the inquiry set out in 9 U.S.C. § 305.
286. See COD.COM., supra note 277, art. 1457 (nullity and voidness of award) and art. 1462 (denial
of full faith and credit).
287. See COD.COM., supra note 277, art. 1461. There is a three-year statute of limitation for enforc-
ing arbitral awards under the New York Convention. Mexico's commercial code, alternatively,
does not expressly indicate the time period within which an action to enforce an arbitral must
be brought. It does, however, require that any challenge to an award's enforceability be
brought within three months from the date notice was given. Id. art. 1458.
288. See Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). For Mexican awards, see Presse Office
S.A., v. Centro Editorial Hoy, S.A. (final judgment of Eighteenth Court on Civil Matters for the
Federal District) Feb. 24, 1977; Malden Mills, Inc. v. Hilaturas Lourdes, S.A. (judgment of the
Eighteenth Court on Civil Matters) Jan. 20, 1977, (revoked Aug. 1, 1977, by the Fifth Chamber
of the Superior Court of Justice of the Federal District); and Mitsui de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. and
Mitsui and Comp., Ltd. v. Alkon Textil, S.A. de C.V., (file of Appeal 850/86 of the Fourth
Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of the Federal District) Oct. 21, 1986, (reviewing a
judgment of the Eighteenth Court on Civil Matters of Mexico City), cited in Wayne I. Fagan,
Arbitration of Private Commercial Disputes Between Residents of Texas and Mexico, Paper pre-
sented at ABA conference on "Practicing Law in the Era of NAFTA: Mastering the New Global
Marketplace,' (Mar. 18, 1999) San Antonio, Texas.
289. See William E. Mooz, Jr. & Alejandro Ortega, Options for Resolving Commercial Disputes in the
NAFTA Era, in AN INTRODUCrION TO DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, supra note 170, at 300.
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erning law, 290 a U.S. private equity fund may seek to have all actions brought in the
courts of and governed by the law of a particular American state.
29 1
Where litigation conducted in the United States (by agreement of the parties) leads
to a judgment, its enforcement in Mexico is "at best difficult and problematic. 292 That is
not to say impossible. But, absent an international treaty mandating otherwise, Mexican
courts will neither recognize nor enforce foreign judgments unless they comply or satisfy
a complicated set of procedures and requirements.
293
c. Litigation in Mexico.
If parties do not expressly choose a forum and governing law, disputes, more likely
than not, will be litigated in Mexico in accordance with Mexican law. The application of
this default selection with respect to commercial entities in Mexico is entirely consistent
with the generally accepted principle that a shareholder's contract of membership is gov-
erned by the law of the place of incorporation (lex societatis).294
Private equity-related disputes that have a strong potential to involve U.S. investors
include the enforcement of rights established in the shareholders agreement (and other
290. A forum selection clause will be upheld provided that the location has some connection with
the dispute and the matter does not involve an issue of public policy or purely local signifi-
cance. See CFPC, supra note 283, art. 566. A choice of law clause, alternatively, can be freely
made within certain parameters. See "Codigo Civil para el Distrito Federal," D.O., Mar. 26,
1928, art. 13 [hereinafter CCDF]. Unlike the black letter of U.S. law, issues involving publicly
traded securities in Mexico are not expressly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the nation.
See Scherck, supra note 288. (Court upheld foreign arbitration agreement, notwithstanding
securities regulation prohibiting waiver of a U.S. party's right to the protection of U.S. securi-
ties laws).
291. Given the fact that both Mexico and the United States are federal systems composed of multi-
ple states, parties should always be specific when selecting a forum. Choice of law tends to be
less of an issue in Mexico, as the primary substantive laws bearing on private equity transac-
tions are federal.
292. Mooz & Ortega, supra note 289, at 282.
293. Mexico, like many other nations, does not have a treaty with the United States to govern the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments due to its generalized wariness of the
potential for U.S. juries to award exorbitant damages. Foreign judgments submitted to
Mexican courts may or may not have to be legalized. See CFPC, supra note 283, art. 552.
Having satisfied this requirement, the certified translation must then be properly transmitted
through the designated competent authority using a letter rogatory (note that an exception
exists for parties situated in adjacent border states). Id. art. 553. Said material is next subject-
ed to a procedure known as an incidente de homolgacion, whereby a Mexican court confirms
that the matter satisfies and/or does not offend Mexican requirements and notions of due
process, subject matter jurisdiction, public order, finality, and comity. Id. art. 569. See also
COD.COM., supra note 277, art. 1347(a). Regarding finality, U.S. investors should realize that
unlike the case in the U.S., Mexican courts do not consider judgments rendered by trial courts
to be res judicata. As for comity, the willingness of U.S. courts to honor valid Mexican judg-
ments is well established and therefore should not operate as a bar to the enforcement of U.S.
judgments in Mexico. See Southwest Livestock and Trucking Comp., Inc. v. Reginaldo Ramon,
169 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 1997).
294. See HANS VAN HOUTTE, THE LAW OF CROSS BORDER SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 1.08 (1999).
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transaction documents) and acts that constitute breaches of responsibility by either a
director or the comisario.
The enforcement of contractual rights amongst shareholders by Latin American
courts has been described as an "age-old" problem.295 In Mexico, the resolution of dis-
putes arising from such agreements may, depending on the circumstances, be governed by
the LGSM, the Codigo de Comercio (to the extent that the purchase and sale of a participa-
tion, share and bond of a mercantile association is considered to be a commercial trans-
action), 296 the Codigo Civil and customary law (insofar as said laws fill in gaps created by
the Codigo de Comercio), and the Ley del Mercado de Valores (in the event an IPO, private
placement, or otherwise exempt offering is involved). 297
Directorial and comisarial responsibilities are, on the other hand, proscribed by the
LGSM. U.S. private equity investors should understand that directors are (1) jointly liable
with the company for the factual existence of capital contributions made by shareholders,
compliance with the requirements of the law relating to the payment of dividends, the
existence and maintenance of systems of accounting, control, bookkeeping, and filing,
and strict compliance with the resolutions of the assembly of shareholders;2 98 (2) jointly
liable with preceding directors for any irregularities committed by the latter;299 (3) per-
sonally and jointly liable (with other directors) for authorizing the acquisition of shares
in violation of article 134;300 and (4) liable for failing to abstain from discussions or deci-
sions in which he or she has a conflict of interest.
30 1
A shareholder may seek redress by going against the bond a director or comisario
may have been required to furnish. 30 2 When such a guarantee was not required the liabil-
ity of a director or comisario may become the subject of a suit by the corporation pur-
suant to the decision of the general assembly of shareholders. 30 3 An exception to the fore-
going applies to shareholders that own thirty-three percent of the capital stock. These
individuals or entities may directly institute proceedings for civil damages against a direc-
tor or comisario provided (1) the claim includes all damages in favor of the company (and
not just those relating to the personal interest of the shareholder) and (2) the shareholder
did not previously concur in any decision of the general assembly of shareholders to
refrain from taking action.304 The proceeds of any recovery belong to the company.
305
295. See Swafford, supra note 279, at 18.
296. CoD.COM., supra note 277, art. 75.
297. The LMV, in turn, sets out its own hierarchy of applicable supplementary laws: (1) commercial
laws, (2) stock exchange and commercial practices, (3) the Civil Code for the Federal District,
and (4) the Federal Code of Civil Procedure. LMV, supra note 220, art. 7. Should a U.S. share-
holder become the victim of fraud or deceit in connection with a private sale of stock, the
investor can (1) request that government authorities institute proceedings against the selling
party in either state or federal court or (2) independently file a complaint in civil court to
obtain a recovery. See Blumenthal & Wolff, supra note 220, at 4, A-44.
298. LGSM, supra note 140, art. 158.
299. Id. art. 160.
300. Id. art. 138.
301. Id. art. 156.
302. Id. art. 152.
303. Id. art. 161.
304. Id. art. 163.
305. Id.
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While the LGSM does not specify any statute of limitations, the Codigo de Comercio
does set forth a five-year period, starting from the time an action could legally have been
exercised through judicial proceedings, for suits "stemming from agreements between
corporations and other entities and transactions regarding the rights and obligations with
stockholders or members; by stockholders or members against the entity; and between
stockholders or members relating to the legal entity. 30 6
U.S. private equity investors should avoid becoming involved in litigation in Mexico.
Experience has shown that outside of the expedited proceedings discussed, supra, lawsuits
in Mexico are long, drawn-out affairs 307 whose outcomes can be highly uncertain given
extensive levels of corruption. 30 8 Compounding this situation is the fact that Mexican
judges-particularly those in rural areas-may not be familiar with the financial issues
involved in private equity transactions. In this regard, U.S. investors should consider that
beyond a handful of large "blue-chip" Mexican corporations, Mexican business people,
lawyers, notaries, and judges have not had extensive exposure to shareholders agreements,
principally due to the fact that until recently there was no class of parties whose relationship
with the company could not be totally managed through the organizational instrument.30 9
III. Conclusion.
Notwithstanding the attractive opportunities associated with the future of private
equity in Mexico, certain aspects of Mexico's political, economic, and social landscape
306. COD.COM., supra note 277, art. 1045.
307. Mexican legal proceedings can become excessively drawn out as the result of a generalized lack
of judicial resources and the abundance of opportunities for interlocutory action.
308. See U.S. Dep't of State, Mexico Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996, Jan. 30,
1997, (visited Mar. 4, 1999) http://www3.itu.ch/MISSIONS/US/hrc/mexico.html. See also
Mexican Official Details Chaos and Corruption in his Office, BALT. SUN, Mar. 4, 1993 (discussing
the extensive level of official corruption in Attorney General's office); Andrew Reding, No Rule
of Law, No Free Trade, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1993 (discussing Mexican judiciary's lack of inde-
pendence from the executive branch and the general absence of the rule of law in Mexico).
State court judges are generally considered to be more susceptible to corruption than their fed-
eral counterparts. Should a U.S. lawyer be exposed to corruption, he or she must remember
the restraints imposed by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as well as local rules of profession-
al responsibility (which do apply to the actions of attorneys committed outside of their state of
license). Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977), as amended
by Act of Aug. 23, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 12 Stat. 1107. See Rona R. Mears, Ethics and Due
Diligence: A Lawyer's Perspective on Doing Business with Mexico, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 605, 612
(1991). With respect to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Mexico is considered to be a "prob-
lem country." See also Alan Cohen, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in CONDUCTING DUE
DILIGENCE, supra note 125, at 624. The significance of this characterization is that it will be
more difficult for U.S. investors to escape liability by pleading ignorance of the nature of
Mexican business practices. In order to help U.S. investors better identify transactions that
potentially violate the FCPA, the U.S. Department of Justice has identified certain precaution-
ary "red flags." Should a U.S. investor remain uncertain about a proposed transaction, that
party can seek a review of the matter by the Department of Justice.
309. See Gordon et al., supra note 215, at 104. Mexican practitioners note that registration rights
agreements "are not well known in Mexico.' Stephenson Jr. et al., supra note 244.
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continue to pose substantial risks for foreign investors. Absent the adequate resolution of
these risks, the diverse and mutually beneficial rewards of private equity financing may
not be fully realized.
A. POLITICAL RISK.
Transnational investment transactions typically entail a degree of political risk, and
Mexico is no exception. Ever since the oil crisis of the early 1980s Mexico has patiently
pursued a policy of political transformation characterized by increased transparency and
competition. Mexico's long dominant party (the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or
PRI) of over seven decades has ceded significant amounts of political control to opposi-
tion parties (principally the PAN and the PRD). As a result of these changes, more oppo-
sition governors are in power today in Mexico than ever before. Similarly, the PRI recently
conceded its loss of control of the lower legislative body, the Camara de Diputados. In
addition to a genuine desire for change on the part of the people, the transformation
accomplished to date can be attributed to the combination of the recent presence of
international observers at Mexico's elections and the introduction of meaningful electoral
laws and controls. 310
The most spectacular manifestation of this political transformation occurred this
summer when Vicente Fox of the PAN put an end to the PRI's seemingly permanent con-
trol of the executive power. In what is looked to as a precursor of Mexico's future political
environment, this radical break with past ways was accomplished in a relatively peaceful
and orderly manner. Fox's election is not, moreover, expected to produce any significant
discontinuation of economic and investment policy. As one trade publication observed,
having reformed so many aspects of Mexico in the last twelve years, "[iut [would] be very
difficult to go back now. '3 11
Another aspect of political risk U.S. investors should be aware of involves the exis-
tence and operation of small pockets of leftist insurgents in rural parts of Mexico's poor
south, namely the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Tabasco. While the actions of
some of these groups have succeeded in capturing global attention in recent years, the
current degree of armed opposition does not pose a significant threat to the interests of
U.S. private equity investors.
The last aspect of political risk investors must consider is expropriation. NAFTA pro-
vides that nationalizations or expropriations are not permitted unless (1) for a public
purpose, (2) on a non-discriminatory basis, and (3) in accordance with due process of
law. Compensation equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment
immediately before the expropriation or nationalization occurred must be paid to the
investor.3 12 The elements of expropriation and nationalization under domestic Mexican
310. "Codigo Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales' D.O., Aug. 15, 1990, as amend-
ed by 1992, 1993, 1994, and Aug. 22, 1996 [hereinafter CFIPE]. U.S. investors will also recall
that there was a rash of high profile politically motivated killings in 1994. This type of activity
had not been characteristic of Mexican politics for many decades, and has not been repeated
since.
311. Watling, supra note 49, at 38.
312. NAFTA, supra note 138, ch. 11, art. 1110.
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law are substantially similar, requiring the existence of a public need and
indemnification. 313
Following years of disagreement between the United States and Mexico 314 as to what
legal standard should be applied to expropriations, the two nations have determined that
such matters should be resolved in accordance with the dictates of international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.3 15 To the extent
that the historical record may inform the present and future, U.S. investors are advised
that past expropriations have been compensated, but not necessarily at the just and fair
rate, nor in a rapid manner. Given NAFTA's clear and protective approach to the subject,
it is unlikely that expropriation will be an issue going forward.
Private equity investors can take steps to insulate themselves against civil disturbance
and expropriation. Pursuant to article 2 of its convention, the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) will "issue guarantees ... against non-commercial risks in
respect of investments in a member country which flow[s] from other member coun-
tries." 316 Assuming a transaction's qualification under article 12 of the convention, 317
MIGA coverage does extend to equity investments involving shares in corporations. 318
Moreover, per paragraph 1.94(IV) of the Draft Operational Rules of the MIGA, the fact
that the stake may represent a minority position will not preclude coverage. 319
Regarding the risk of civil disturbance, MIGA coverage extends to "organized vio-
lence directed against the host government which has as its objective the overthrow of
such government or its ouster from a specific region,'' 320 as well as to certain types of
"riots" and "civil commotions." Examples of this coverage include revolution, rebellion,
insurrection, and coup d'etat.32 1 Loss coverage extends to the removal, destruction, or
damaging of an investment projects assets or cases where there has been substantial inter-
ference with the operation of an investment project. 322
313. MEx. CONST., supra note 268, art. 27.
314. Takings issues between the United States and Mexico date back at least as far as the end of the
Mexican Revolution. In 1938, the U.S. Secretary of State articulated the U.S. position that tak-
ings of American property committed by foreign governments should be done in accordance
with universally accepted principles of international law, based on the dictates of reason, equity
and justice. In the American view, due compensation should be prompt and just. The
Mexican government, in turn, maintained the position that there is no obligation under inter-
national law to make either immediate or deferred compensation in the context of general and
impersonal expropriations. According to Mexico, this position was particularly valid where the
expropriations had been carried out for purposes that went to a larger social goal (for example,
the redistribution of land pursuant to an agrarian revolution). 3 HACKWORTH DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 655-61 (1942), in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 418 (Henry J. Steiner &
Detlev F. Vagts eds., 2d ed. 1976).
315. NAFTA, supra note 138, ch. 11, art. 1105(1).
316. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 1985, in
MIGA AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 109 (Ibrahim F.!. Shihata ed., 1988) [hereinafter MIGA].
Mexico and the United States are both member countries.
317. Id. at 111.
318. Id. at 112.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 135.
321. Id.
322. Id.
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MIGA's expropriation coverage, alternatively, "may encompass, but is not limited to,
measures of expropriation, nationalization, confiscation, sequestration, seizure, attach-
ment, and freezing of assets.323 These measures may be coverable in relation to self-exe-
cuting legislation as well as administrative omissions. In all cases, however, the action or
omission must be attributable to the "host government:' a term that is read to mean any
"public authority."324 Not surprisingly, some confusion has been associated with the exact
scope of "public authority."
B. ECONOMIC RISK.
As was the case with politics, it is common for transnational investment transactions
to entail a degree of economic risk. This is particularly true in Mexico, where, notwith-
standing significant economic reform and progress, 325 there continue to exist certain fun-
damental economic infirmities.
One of the most significant economic problems Mexico has recently had to face con-
cerns the FOBAPROA (Fondo Bancario para Proteccion al Ahorro) scandal. Years of opera-
tion, characterized by non-accountability, self-dealing, and fraudulent deposits left Mexico's
banking system, much of which had been privatized in 1991, weak and on the verge of insol-
vency. While the cost of the recently negotiated settlement is high, 326 the overall experience
has served as a positive catalyst for the introduction of a number of badly needed economic
changes. For example, the former practice of providing full deposit insurance was abolished
in December of 1998, and a new organization was created for the protection of bank savings
(the Instututo para la Proteccion al Ahorro Bancario, or IPAB). 327 To the extent the new IPAB
rules limit maximum deposit insurance coverage to 400,000 UDIs (approximately
U.S.$1 10,000), per person, per institution by 2005, they may provide a degree of moral haz-
ard to bankers that have otherwise been inclined to misuse depositors' money. As a recent
government report notes, "the limits on deposit insurance should foster market discipline
and self-regulation by banking institutions, while protecting small depositors' savings." 328 In
the same vein, Mexico has been required to commit itself to the full application of the Basle
Core Principles for effective bank supervision, as well as more vigorous accounting and loan
classification practices, in order to obtain crucial World Bank329 and IMF330 financial sup-
323. Id. at 125.
324. Id. at 126.
325. One clear manifestation of Mexico's progress in the eyes of the financial world is its recent
attainment of investment grade status for its sovereign dollar denominated debt by Moody's.
See Moody's Upgrade a Boost for Mexico, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 8, 2000, at 26.
326. The Mexican government's bailout of the banks will cost Mexican taxpayers approximately
U.S.$80 billion. Under the terms of the deal, all outstanding bank liabilities will be converted
to public debt payable over thirty years. This outcome raises the total public debt burden to
over forty percent of Mexico's GDP. See Robert Salinas-Leon, Mexico's Bank Bailout Quarrel
Misses a Key Point, June 26, 1998 (visited Dec. 25, 1999) http://www-
personal.umd.umich.edu/-mtwomey/newspapers/062698me.html.
327. See SHCP Report, supra note 2. See also Instituto para la proteccion al Ahorro Bancario (visited
Dec. 25, 1999) http://www.ipab.org.mx.
328. Id.
329. See Rogers et al., supra note 86, at 68.
330. See Memorandum of Economic Policies attached to the Letter of Intent Sent to the IMF (visited
Jan. 7,2000) http://www.shcp.gob.mx/english/docs/m990615.html.
162 NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas
port. To this end, the CNBV (Comisidn Nacional de Bancos y Valores) recently introduced a
regulation making it difficult for borrowers with bad credit to obtain additional credit (this
regulation is to be enforced via the credit bureau). 331
The legislative resolution of the FOBAPROA crisis generally bodes well for private
equity in Mexico. Previously, companies with large quantities of unresolved debt had
been unable to attract private equity backing for recapitalizations. Now there is clear
guidance with respect to corporate debt, industry practitioners expect to see an increase
in private equity led restructuring activity.332
An exception to the foregoing observation involves the negative fallout that resulted
from U.S. investors having witnessed the way in which many Mexican debtors, once
under financial pressure, simply disregarded their contractual obligations to service their
debts, The uncertainty engendered by this practice recendy prompted one fund manager
to comment: "that has made me ... worried about being a minority investor in a country
where you could walk out on your contract." 333 The obvious significance of this experi-
ence should not be lost to U.S. private equity investors in Mexico.
Another economic risk a U.S. private equity investor may encounter involves curren-
cy transfer controls. Until recently, Mexico prohibited the repatriation of capital for a
period of twelve years following investment. 334 As noted, supra, this prohibition has been
repealed and investors can now freely transfer currency out of the country.335
This said, however, foreign investors must nonetheless be careful. Outside of NAFTA
article 1109's general promise of freedom to repatriate, NAFTA article 2104 specifically
leaves the door open to Mexico's introduction of capital controls under certain conditions
(for example, in response to a balance of payments emergency).336 NAFTA article 1410
may accomplish the same end, albeit in an oblique manner, by permitting member states
to adopt reasonable measures for prudent reasons. Under this article, a NAFTA member,
citing the need to maintain the safety and soundness of its financial institutions and sys-
tems, could impose capital transfer restrictions. 337
As was the case with civil disturbance and expropriation risk, an investor can obtain
protection against the imposition of capital controls through the MIGA Convention.
Specifically, article 11(a)(i) provides coverage against "any introduction attributable to
the host government of restrictions on the transfer outside the host country of its curren-
cy into a freely usable currency or another currency acceptable to the holder of the guar-
331. See SHCP Report, supra note 2.
332. See A Private Affair, supra note 95.
333. Id.
334. This policy was designed to help prevent the draining of Mexico's foreign currency reserves,
especially in times of capital flight. See Zahralddin & Jones, supra note 94, at 913.
335. NAFTA, supra note 138, ch. 11, art. 1109(4)(a)-(e). This article does permit, however, transfers
to be prevented in an equitable, non-discriminatory, and good faith manner. Examples of
transfers that can be prevented in this way are those relating to bankruptcy, securities issues
and trades, criminal actions, the satisfaction of judgments, and reports of transfers of currency
or other monetary instruments.
336. Id. ch. 21, art. 2104.
337. Id. ch. 14, art. 1410(l)(b) & (c).
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antee" 338 Investors should realize, however, that coverage only extends to currency repre-
senting returns on, or repatriated capital of, the guaranteed investment. 339
While the foregoing economic risks are largely the function of events internal to
Mexico, economic events external to the country can also pose risks. Consider, in this
connection, Mexico's balance of payments record. Over the last twenty years, Mexico has
been unable to produce economic growth "without also creating the conditions for an
eventual balance of payments crisis' 340 Although Mexico has taken a number of positive
steps to overcome this recurring problem, namely, the encouragement of domestic sav-
ings,34 1 the maintenance of a tight control over the current account, 342 and the continu-
ing promotion of exports,343 the possibility always exists that the purchase of imports on
credit could again inappropriately exceed exports.
Mexico's traditional dependence on revenues raised through taxes on the sale of oil
also presents an economic risk. Insofar as the government's budget is "largely" funded by
these proceeds, sudden changes in the price and demand for oil can result in economic
disjointment. 344 Per one industry publication, a drop in the price per barrel of oil can
force the government "to reassess spending as tax revenue falls in line with lower [oil]
prices. That will mean less money for education, health care, investment in infrastructure
and a host of other programs."345 As a means of circumventing this dependency, Mexico
has over the last years taken steps to increase the tax base and fight tax evasion. 346 As the
Mexican treasury's millennium report states, "The structural reform of the tax system is
an ongoing process. Thus, every year the government has tried to close ... loopholes,
while taking the necessary steps to make tax collection more efficient, transparent and
equitable.... [T]he government intends to implement ... measures that [consider] tax
evasion above certain threshold [levels] as a serious crime, as is the case in other OECD
countries."347 Since the introduction of these tougher tax policies circa 1994-1995, tax
revenue as a percentage of GDP has increased slowly and steadily.
338. MIGA, supra note 316, at 123.
339. Id.
340. Watling, supra note 49, at 38.
341. Mexico's domestic savings rate has increased over the last five years from 14.8 percent of GDP
in 1994 to 22.1 percent as of the first quarter of 1999. SHCP Report, supra note 2.
342. In 1994, the current account represented seven percent of GDP. That percentage dropped to
2.7 by the first half of 1999. Id.
343. As the result of well-organized export programs at both the federal and state level (for exam-
ple, PITEX, ALTEX, ECEX), Mexican exports have grown substantially since 1994. Total
exports were U.S.$117 billion in 1998. To Mexico's further credit, oil exports have dropped
from approximately forty percent of the total exports in 1982 to approximately 21.4 percent of
total exports in 1999. Id.
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The last economic risk private equity investors should contemplate involves Mexico's
capacity to withstand financial crises or shocks around the globe. While it did experience
turbulence following the Brazilian and Asian crises, Mexico's economy bounced right
back. In the case of the Brazilian devaluation, Mexico's stock exchange actually went on to
quickly surpass the pre-Brazilian devaluation level of trading. 348 These facts indicate that
Mexico is today more resilient to the shocks that periodically reverberate throughout the
global economy.
From the foregoing it is clear that Mexico's economic system, like that of many coun-
tries in the throes of substantial transformation, has experienced fundamental difficulties.
It is also clear, moreover, that there exist a number of issues that have the potential to
become economic problems, given the right coalescence of circumstances. As noted,
supra, Mexico's recent and ongoing reforms will help avoid such problems.
In this same preventative spirit, private equity investors should ensure that they rec-
ognize the significance of the fact that the United States and Mexico are neighbors. More
than one political analyst has noted how events that transpire in Mexico-for example, a
currency fluctuation, a trade spat, illegal immigration patterns, narcotics distribution
practices, etc.-are of the utmost importance to the U.S. government. Indeed, as subtle as
the characterization may seem, many political analysts view Mexico as one of our coun-
try's top national security concerns. This point is illustrated by the way the Clinton
administration arranged for an emergency loan package in response to Mexico's 1994
devaluation larger in size than that entailed in the Marshall Plan. 349
From the perspective of economic risk, these events and facts communicate a very
important message. That is, by virtue of our proximity to and inter-connectedness with
Mexico, we have a strong interest in seeing Mexico succeed. To the extent that the strength
of this interest can be relied upon going forward, U.S. investors may be inclined to feel
less threatened by Mexican economic risks. In the event this does not constitute sufficient
assurance, U.S. investors should consider the components of the "Financial Strengthening
Program" Totaling U.S.$16.9 billion, the resources represent a combination of loans,
credit lines, and stand-by arrangements from the IMF, World Bank, Inter-American
Development Bank, and the Exim Bank for the benefit of Mexico's immediate develop-
ment and continued economic security.350
C. THE CHALLENGES OF INVESTING IN A FAMILY OWNED BUSINESS.
Perhaps the most unique risk associated with private equity transactions derives from
being a minority shareholder in a small to medium-sized Mexican company. Unlike the
United States with its abundance of publicly owned corporations, the basic business model
348. Actions taken to this end include: (1) the elimination of the immediate depreciation scheme,
(2) restricting the ability of related firms to consolidate losses, (3) the enhancement of taxpayer
registration programs, (4) the introduction of tougher penalties for non-compliance, and (5)





in Mexico is the family-based firm.35 1 Consistent with the Mexican family's traditional role
as the central social unit, the maintenance of absolute control has historically served as a
means of simultaneously generating revenue and strengthening the nation's social fabric.
352
With time, however, this tradition is starting to loosen. Faced for the first time in
decades with meaningful economic competition, many Mexican companies have begun
to view the prospect of taking on outside investors as crucial to their survival.
Alternatively, the recent boom in Latin American merger and acquisition activity has
served as an inducement to other family run firms to exit their holdings altogether or
consolidate for globalization.
353
Implicit in this process is the unprecedented opening up of Mexico's boards. Picking up
on this trend, one trade publication notes how "many Latin American companies want their
operations more professionally managed, and therefore view the involvement of sophisticat-
ed financial investors as a means to that end "'354 While this practice in Mexico started with
larger sized (often publicly traded) companies (for example, Carlos Slim's Grupo Carso,
Alejo Peralta's lusacell, the Lucioni family's Carsa, Carlos Gonzalez' Comercial Mexicana,
Ricardo Salinas' TV Azteca and Grupo Elektra, and the Garza Laguera's Coca-Cola Femsa), it
now serves as a model for SMSEs interested in private equity.
Notwithstanding this positive trend, however, family-run Mexican companies con-
tinue to maintain controlling positions. As one financial commentator observed, Mexico's
corporate culture has become more modern, but "many Mexican companies remain
closely held by families."355 This is echoed by the commentary of another industry practi-
tioner who relates, "[o]n the equity side, . . . most Mexican issuers are not issuing securi-
ties that represent a controlling position, and ... most of the original owners of these
companies continue to control them."356
The taking of a minority position is rich in opportunities for abuse and, as one
financial publication points out, "the infringement of minority shareholders rights in
Latin America is nothing new."357 For example, majority founders may not willingly pro-
vide reliable, up-to-date information, personalities may conflict, and finances may be co-
mingled. Alternatively, minority outside investors may find themselves unable to partici-
pate in such a way as to effectively protect their financial interests. 358 Because it is impos-
sible for a private equity investor to foresee the treatment it will receive as a minority
shareholder, it is again recommended that U.S. parties incorporate the rights and mecha-
nisms discussed supra into the investment agreement. This action, coupled with a wise
investment selection process, will mitigate the risk aspects of investing in a family-run
business in Mexico.
351. Following the poorly executed currency devaluation, the exchange rate fell fifty-four percent
between December 1994 and March 1995. This event caused a devastating reduction in
Mexico's purchasing power. See Rogers et al., supra note 86, at 74. In a sign of economic vigor,
Mexico paid off its U.S.$50 billion loan ahead of schedule.
352. See SHCP Report, supra note 2.
353. See Adler, supra note 121, at 18.
354. See id.
355. See Swafford, supra note 279, at 17.
356. A Private Affair, supra note 95.
357. Brendan M. Case, All in the Family, LATIN TRADE, Sept. 1998, at 36.
358. Rogers et al., supra note 86, at 72.
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D. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
1. Observations.
Despite private equity financing's increasing popularity in Mexico, it is still very
much in a "formative" stage.359 Its nascent nature is clearly reflected in the observation of
Jacques Gliksberg, a fund manager with the Latin American Group of the Bank of
America, that he spends more time explaining the concept of private equity than actually
constructing deals. 3
60
Initial experience with private equity financing in Mexico indicates that its effects can
be beneficial on several different levels. U.S. investors willing to put their money into
long-term, risk-laden transactions are compensated with greater than average returns.
Capital-starved, competition-weary Mexican companies receive the financing they need,
as well as the managerial expertise of foreign directors. And, as a result of the diversifica-
tion of foreign investment inflows, the Mexican government has a better chance of
achieving balance and stability in the nation's economic development.
Central to the success of private equity is a fund's ability to exit an investment. In this
regard, Mexico has demonstrated no shortage of viable alternatives. To date, the most
obvious means of exit has been by sale of a fund's stake, either to extant management or a
third party with strategic interests. This practice coincides profitably with the increased
quantity of mergers, acquisitions, and industry consolidation that has recently swept
Latin America, as well as the positive clarification of the private sector's FOBAPROA-
related debt situation. Insofar as consolidation is expected to continue for the foreseeable
future, U.S. private equity funds have reason to be confident of their ability to exit.
Exits accomplished by way of IPO on the other hand, have not been as common. In
contrast to some of its Latin neighbors, Mexico has yet to produce a line of high profile,
NASDAQ-oriented "punto-com" entities. In fact, the handful of Mexican private equity
transactions that have resulted in IPOs demonstrate little consistency in terms of the
underlying type of business. 361
The probability that this situation will change going forward is good. Legislative, eco-
nomic, and political change has resulted in the creation of a pro-investment environment
characterized by an expanded number of potential investors with improved access to cap-
ital. Mexico's newly attained investment grade status may enhance this environment inso-
far as foreign institutional investors will now be able to hold larger amounts of Mexican
securities.
Drawing on the early experience of Argentina, these investors, along with venture
capitalists, will represent the most important source of financing available 362 to the
increased number of Internet-based e-commerce sites that are projected to be established
359. Swafford, supra note 279, at 17.
360. See Colin Johnson, Gerente, CDC - America Central, Los Retos de Invertir en Un Negocio
Familiar, Paper presented at conference on "Capital de Desarollo en Mexico," Nov. 10-11, 1999,
Veracruz, Mexico.
361. See Mailander, supra note 46, at 71.
362. See Evans, supra note 28, at 23.
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in Mexico 363 and Latin America by 2003.364 To the extent that foreign Internet ventures
have resulted in IPOs, it is expected that this trend will result in an increased number of
Mexican entities going to market either on the BMV or abroad. In this connection, the
BMV's recent expression of willingness to waive the strict time requirements associated
with a prospective issuer's financial disclosure will directly accommodate the listing of
Internet start-up companies. Similarly, U.S. exchanges continue to relax listing and trad-
ing requirements with the hope of attracting more foreign companies. Each of these
developments bode well for the future of private equity in Mexico.
2. Recommendations.
Implementation of the following recommendations would help Mexican and U.S.
parties secure the maximum benefits available through private equity financing.
a. Mexico.
Domestically, Mexico must continue the process of pro-investment legislative
reform. While solid progress is being made to update Mexico's commercial code for the
purpose of e-commerce, 365 the LGSM, which was first introduced in 1934 (and been the
subject of few revisions since), is badly outdated in certain areas crucial to private equity
financing. For example, there are no express provisions in the LGSM addressing share-
holders agreements, super-majorities, and registration rights. Absent such provisions,
U.S. investors interested in protecting their rights must contend with the additional com-
plexity, cost, and time associated with the establishment and maintenance of a voting
trust. As Mexico moves to bring its other laws into line with contemporary commercial
reality, it should not fail to modernize the LGSM.
In related fashion, Mexico should also ensure that it completes the initiatives it has
taken to liberalize the investment discretion of AFORES and the requirements for listing
equities on the BMV.
Private equity's future in Mexico can additionally be strengthened by events and
actions that have an international nexus. Mexico's anticipated adoption of the OECD's pro-
posed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) would work in conjunction with
instruments such as the MIGA to enhance foreign investors' sense of investment security.
366
363. Mexican companies that did IPOs after receiving private equity funding include Latin
Americano Duty Free, S.A. de C.V. (retail), Agriexp (agribusiness), Tekchem (chemicals),
Milano, and Arabela. See Trigueros, supra note 222.
364. While the Mexican government has established a development fund called "FIDETEC" (under
the SEP's Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia) to provide low interest financing and
matching grants to high tech start ups, its financing abilities amount to a modest $8 million
per year. See Young, supra note 37, at 41.
365. To this end, TELMEX's Carlos Slim and Microsoft have joined forces to create a new Latin-ori-
ented Internet portal. An initial presence has been established in the United States and six
other Latin nations. See id. at 39.
366. See Krochmal, supra note 37. The implications of this fact are of historic proportions. Mexico has
traditionally been a nation of exporters of primary materials, distributors, licensees, and fran-
chisees. With the advent of the Internet, Mexico has been afforded the opportunity to exchange its
passive economic development model for one involving independent innovation. As the experi-
ence of the last five years has demonstrated, this development has opened the door to the introduc-
tion of financing mechanisms previously incompatible with Mexico's economic reality.
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Moreover, having recently adopted the World Bank's "Principles of Best Corporate
Governance Practices" '367 Mexico's private sector commercial organizations and cham-
bers of commerce should encourage their widespread application. Effective advocacy on
this point, combined with the recent imposition of tougher accounting practices, should
provide U.S. investors with a greater degree of confidence regarding the financial dealings
of their Mexican business partners.
Last, Mexico should maintain the various lines of credit and support available under
its "Financial Strengthening Package." Given the unpredictable frequency and intensity of
both international and domestic shocks, financial "back-up" of this type can work in con-
junction with Mexico's geo-political proximity to the United States to further strengthen
the confidence of U.S. investors.
b. U.S. Investors.
Successful private equity transactions for U.S. investors are those that simultaneously
maximize protection and profit. In order to accomplish this, U.S. investors must be both
informed and vigilant.
On the front end of a deal, U.S. investors must select investment targets with special
care. While Mexican entities, with whom the U.S. investor has an established relationship
are always safest, the recommendation of a trusted local source should not be discounted.
An effective due diligence program, carried out jointly by Mexican counsel and U.S. fund
managers, will serve to confirm the wisdom (or imprudence) of the investment selection.
Once committed to a transaction, it is imperative that U.S. investors retain local
counsel for the structuring and execution of the investment agreement. Given the relative
novelty of private equity financing in Mexico, U.S. investors should ensure that said coun-
sel is knowledgeable and experienced in the realization of this type of transaction. To the
extent that they understand Mexico's deal-specific regulations and general legal environ-
ment, U.S. investors will be able to participate more effectively in a transaction. Particular
attention should be paid to the granting of rights, the formation of voting trusts, and dis-
pute resolution mechanisms.
Finally, vigilant monitoring of the investment by U.S. investors may be accomplished
through either the involvement of a fund representative in the daily management of the
recipient company or the meaningful representation of the fund in the Mexican compa-
ny's board. Improved means of disseminating information (for example, over the
Internet) and communication (for example, by video conferencing or e-mail) directly
facilitate the ability of U.S. investors to monitor investments.
367. See Inicitiva con Proyecto de Decreto, que Reforma y Adiciona Diversas Disposiciones al Codigo de
Comercio, en Relacion al Comercio a Traves de Medios Electronicos y Firma Electronica (visited
Feb. 28, 2000) http://www.natlaw.com/ecommerce/docs/e-commerce-iniciative-mexico.htm.
368. As proposed, said agreement would provide greater protection to U.S. investors than those
already available under the WTO and NAFTA. See Stephen J. Canner, Exceptions and
Conditions: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 657, 664 (1998).
369. Codigo de Mejores Practicas Corporativas [as administered by El Consejo Coordinador
Empresarial (CCE) and the Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV)] (visited Jan. 25,
2000) http://www.worldbank.org/htmI/fpd/privatesector/cg/codes.htm.
